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Abstract 
 
“Hacerles creer que hay plomo” (“Convincing them there is lead”): 
Health, Environment, and Power in Abra Pampa, Argentina 
 
Emily Jane Spangenberg, MA 
The University of Texas at Austin, 2011 
 
Supervisor:  Javier Auyero 
 
When the lead smelting plant Metal Huasi closed in the late 1980s, it left 60,000 
tons of heavy metal waste deposited throughout Abra Pampa, Argentina, a town in the 
Northwestern province of Jujuy.  Much of this waste, predominantly composed of lead, 
remains exposed to the air, over 20 years after the smelter has closed, and Abra Pampa 
residents await the completion of a polemical environmental remediation plan that was 
drafted in 2007 but is years behind schedule.  The issue of lead contamination has largely 
been normalized and obscured by management of public information and scientific 
discourse, as well as through the active discrediting of evidence of human suffering in the 
town.   
Ethnographic research conducted in Abra Pampa in 2010 engages with Javier 
Auyero and Débora Swistun‟s sociological work on “environmental suffering” and “toxic 
 vi 
uncertainty”, concepts used to analyze how confusion on sources, effects, and solutions 
to widespread environmental contamination is socially constructed and reflects political 
power dynamics.  In Abra Pampa, much uncertainty about the gravity and extent of lead 
contamination has been compounded and capitalized upon by officials working in 
association with the lucrative mining industry in Jujuy.  This case study posits that 
disagreement among Abra Pampa residents on the actual health risks that exposure to 
lead waste poses is largely a result of contradictory studies and long periods of 
governmental inaction toward environmental remediation. Additionally, discourse on the 
dangers of lead contamination among Abra Pampa residents is fragmented, reflecting 
class bias and discrimination that tends to blame certain residents for exposure to 
contamination.  Despite several published studies indicating dangerously high levels of 
lead in residents‟ blood, concerned residents liken their consistent criticism of 
governmental inaction on the issue to a process of “convincing” authorities that there is 
indeed lead, and that it represents a threat to the population. 
This case study concludes with sketches of some of the possibilities for 
mobilization toward positive change in Abra Pampa – namely pressuring governmental 
agencies into providing full environmental and health remediation – which parts from 
Auyero and Swistun‟s notion that widespread toxic uncertainty might preclude such 
mobilization.    
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 1 
INTRODUCTION 
When the lead smelting plant Metal Huasi first closed in the late 1980s, it left 
roughly 60,000 tons of heavy metal waste deposited throughout Abra Pampa, Argentina, 
a town of about 13,000 in the Northwestern province of Jujuy.  This waste, which 
consists predominantly of lead, accumulated in three sites since the smelter began 
processing metals from nearby mines in the late 1940s: it walled a riverbed of the Arroyo 
Tabladitas just outside of Abra Pampa, towered in a 15,000-ton pile next to the smelting 
plant in the town center, and was spread in a football field-sized area of land in the 
growing Barrio 12 de Octubre, a few blocks east of the smelter.  Much of this waste 
remains exposed to the air – now over 20 years after the smelter has closed – and Abra 
Pampa residents await the completion of a polemical environmental remediation 
(cleanup) plan that was drafted in 2007 that is years behind schedule.  With the exception 
of a few sporadic instances of sustained collective mobilization before the smelter closed 
in the late 1980s and again from about 2004-2007, health and environmental problems 
associated with lead contamination have largely been normalized and obscured by 
management of public information and scientific discourse, as well as through the active 
discrediting of evidence of human suffering in the town.   
Ethnographic research conducted in Abra Pampa in 2010 engages with 
sociological work  on “environmental suffering,” which examines the ways in which 
everyday routines and competing discourse on contamination cause confusion and 
uncertainty on its sources, effects, and associated risk.
1
  This confusion and uncertainty 
                                                 
1 In their case study  of Flammable, a shantytown  in Buenos Aires, Javier Auyero and Débora Swistun 
define “environmental suffering” as a form of “social suffering”: “suffering as the product of agents‟ 
position in the social space” (16). In this case, social suffering is specifically that which is “caused by the 
concrete polluting actions of specific actors” and which “is sometimes appropriated, [and] other times 
denied or amplified, by existing institutions, usually for the sake of their own legitimation.”  Javier Auyero 
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can relegate suffering linked to environmental contamination to background noise and 
perhaps preclude collective mobilization around it due to an absence of a common 
understanding on its effects. In Abra Pampa, the issue of lead is indeed fraught with 
ambiguity.   Despite the existence government studies published as early as 1986 that 
acknowledge high levels of lead in residents‟ blood and Abra Pampa‟s notoriety as a 
highly contaminated place in local and national media, lead contamination has only 
sporadically been a salient point of contention for most of the town‟s history (at least in 
the public eye).  The reason for this is closely linked to power relations in Abra Pampa 
and between the community and the mining industry in Argentina, which tend to 
compound and capitalize on the uncertainty that residents face on the extent and gravity 
of contamination in the town. Concerned residents liken their consistent criticism of 
governmental authorities‟ inaction on lead contamination to a process of “convincing 
them there is lead,” as one resident put it, pointing to an almost complete denial of the 
existence of the toxic substance and its health effects. 
The present study provides three “snapshots” of perceptions of lead contamination 
that illustrate the ways in which it is obscured in Abra Pampa: through confusion 
exacerbated by “outsider” and “expert” control and production of knowledge on lead 
contamination, through class-based discourse that tends to blame some residents for their 
own suffering, and through the lens of a few concerned residents who have consistently 
voiced concern on the issue of lead.  It concludes by sketching the “empirical 
possibilities” for positive change in the community. 
I traveled to Abra Pampa in January, June and July of 2010 to conduct 
ethnographic research on the ways in which residents discuss and live with lead 
                                                                                                                                                 
and Débora Swistun, Flammable: Environmental Suffering in an Argentine Shantytown (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2009), 17. 
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contamination.  This work built on earlier research carried out during April and May of 
2009 to prepare a report for the Human Rights Clinic of the University of Texas School 
of Law on breaches of health and environmental rights in the town.  During these visits, I 
briefly lived the hope, contradiction, and frustration that are part of Abra Pampa‟s 
environmental and public health realities, and which have intensified for some residents 
in recent years as they await promised remediation.  Some of the uncertainty that exists 
on contamination in Abra Pampa today stems from the governing province of Jujuy‟s 
management of and inaction on remediation in Abra Pampa, as well as its attempts to 
control information on actual risks residents face.  The ministries of Health and 
Production and Environment of the province of Jujuy have discredited independent 
studies on levels of lead contamination in the town, particularly when said studies 
provide evidence of the human consequences of activity of the lucrative mining industry.  
As a researcher, this has made “objectively” understanding the question of lead 
contamination particularly difficult; after visiting the town and spending hours talking 
with residents who suspect grave health problems due to lead poisoning, there seem to be 
clear environmental and health crises.  Few people speak publicly about these crises, 
however, and little public, official information exists to quantify, or in some cases even 
recognize, the extent to which lead poses a threat to residents.  Confusion has also been 
exacerbated in recent years after the partial, haphazard initiation of environmental 
remediation, which has displaced mobilization on contamination and sent mixed signals 
on the actual risks residents face from exposure to lead waste. 
On my second trip to Abra Pampa in January of 2010, I experienced firsthand the 
provincial government‟s attitude toward independently gathered and produced 
information on the issue of lead contamination.  I spent some time in San Salvador de 
Jujuy, the capital of the province of Jujuy, to conduct interviews with people who have 
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intervened on the issue of Metal Huasi waste in Abra Pampa, including the Ministry of 
Health of the province.  I set up an interview with Dr. Marcelo Bellone, Secretary of 
Policy Planning and Health Regulation, with whom I had met in 2009 with other 
members of the Human Rights Clinic of the University of Texas to discuss whether 
health treatment of Abra Pampa residents was included as part of a proposed 
environmental remediation plan. The Clinic‟s report, which had been published in the 
time between the fact-finding delegation‟s visit in April 2009 and my second independent 
visit in January 2010, makes several recommendations to the Ministry of Health of the 
Province of Jujuy, namely on treating and informing residents of health risks they face 
due to lead contamination.
2
  When I arrived at Dr. Bellone‟s office in January of 2010 to 
follow up on questions on access to health information and education in Abra Pampa, I 
was met by not only Dr. Bellone himself, but officials from five other branches of the 
provincial government who Bellone had invited to the meeting as well. Thinking 
(naively, in hindsight) that this was an opportune moment to obtain information I was 
missing on the government‟s remediation plans, I introduced myself and explained that I 
had come to Jujuy to research environmental remediation in Abra Pampa. 
I soon learned that the Ministry of Health had also seen this interview as an 
opportune moment – not necessarily for exchange of information, but to publicly 
discredit the report my colleagues and I had published a few months earlier.  They had all 
seen the report, and instead of addressing questions on my independent research project, 
they spent an hour telling me that my work was “completely invalid,” had “no scientific 
basis,” was “dangerous,” and even “a human rights abuse in itself.”  Their particular 
                                                 
2 Danielle Nasr, Emily Spangenberg, Meghan Vail, Christopher Willett, and Matthew Wooten.  “Abra 
Pampa: A Community Polluted, A Community Ignored: The Struggle for Environmental and Health Rights 
in Argentina” (human rights report, University of Texas School of Law, 2009), 3. 
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objection to the publication of the human rights report was that it had not received prior 
“approval” from the province.  I was told that the report was not a sound basis for further 
research on Abra Pampa, since it cited independent studies that they claimed had not 
received publication approval from the provincial government and would cause “undue 
alarm” in Abra Pampa.  
During this meeting, two groups of newspaper photographers separately entered 
Dr. Bellone‟s office and began taking photos of the interview.  Later, a man entered with 
a video camera and began filming the meeting.  Not wanting to jeopardize the work my 
colleagues and I had done a few months prior, I kept quiet during most of this time – 
even though I firmly believed we had done nothing wrong, and that I was building on 
legitimate scientific research that academics and health professionals had conducted in 
Abra Pampa in the past.  The officials in this meeting told me I would have to 
“completely revise” the human rights report my colleagues and I had produced, and 
handed me a report of a study that the Ministry of Health had conducted in Abra Pampa 
to “georeference” cases of lead poisoning in the town before I left the meeting.  The 
report they gave me concluded that 10 percent of Abra Pampa residents were “probably” 
contaminated with lead,
3
 contradicting a study from the INQA group (Instituto de 
Química Aplicada, “Applied Chemistry Institute” of the National University of Jujuy) 
from 2006, which the Clinic‟s human rights report references, that concluded that 80 
percent of children living near Metal Huasi had dangerous levels of lead in their blood.  
Ironically, the Ministry of Health‟s report uses parts of the introduction to INQA‟s 2006 
report introduction verbatim, despite having declared it “scientifically invalid” in their 
meeting with me. 
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After spending more time in the province and in Abra Pampa itself, I learned that 
this type of scenario is not uncommon in interactions with the provincial government, 
especially when it comes to research on environmental, health, and land rights violations 
associated with the lucrative mining industry.  Fortunately, all that came of my January 
2010 meeting in Dr. Bellone‟s office was a newspaper article “affirming” the provincial 
authorities‟ position.  In this article, Dr. Bellone is quoted as saying “It is a question of 
where they [the authors of the University of Texas report] got their data, because if [the 
report] is based on false premises, logically they will arrive at false final results.”4  The 
provincial government‟s reactions to the Human Rights Clinic report, my presence in 
Jujuy, and to other groups‟ dissemination of independent research on the topic of lead 
contamination in Abra Pampa indicate an unwillingness to acknowledge and act upon an 
objective health and environmental threat.  Government officials claim that “every day 
we have been working on cleaning up all the contaminating material and improving the 
health of the population…There are many things that just might not be tangible right 
now.”5 This has been the official government line since a remediation plan, still far from 
complete, was drafted in 2007.  Information has been strategically managed and framed 
in a way to discredit claims to the contrary. 
State management of information and “framing” of the issue of contamination in 
Abra Pampa represent one manifestation of what Javier Auyero and Débora Swistun call 
                                                 
4 Original: “Es decir de donde obtuvieron los datos porque si parte de premisas falsas, lógicamente llegarán 
a resultados finales falsos.”  “Bellone se reunió con representantes de la Universidad de Texas por 
contaminación,” Jujuy al dia,  9 January 2010,  
http://www.periodicociudad.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=3069:bellone-se-
reunio-con-representantes-de-la-universidad-de-texas-por-contaminacion-ambiental. 
5 Original: “[H]oy por hoy se trabajó en la extracción de todo el material pasivo y en la salud de la 
población, como así también se está construyendo un nuevo hospital en Abra Pampa. Es decir son muchas 
cosas que quizás no sean tan tangibles actualmente.” From “Bellone se reunió con representantes de la 
Universidad de Texas por contaminación ambiental.” 
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“toxic uncertainty,” a concept that will be applied to the case of Abra Pampa to analyze 
perceptions of lead contamination there.  In their case study of Flammable, a similarly 
highly polluted community outside of Buenos Aires, Auyero and Swistun define the 
concept of “toxic uncertainty” as “multiple, confused, and often contradictory points of 
view on the polluted habitat.”6 Analysis of toxic uncertainty identifies “the interacting 
„invisible elbows‟ of external power forces and of everyday routine survival struggles” 
that shape residents‟ suffering.7  In Abra Pampa, the government of the province of 
Jujuy‟s discursive framing of the issue of contamination, interventions toward 
environmental remediation, studies that attempt to define or negate the extent of 
contamination in the town, and residents‟ narratives on lead all contribute to this 
uncertainty.  This study of Abra Pampa draws on Auyero and Swistun‟s concept of toxic 
uncertainty to analyze the mechanisms by which residents understand lead 
contamination, as well as the positions of agents who seek to define it as a public health 
issue. 
It should be noted here that, although conceptually the cases of Abra Pampa and 
Flammable have much in common, there are a few important empirical differences 
between the two places that have given the present study of Abra Pampa a distinct 
starting-off point.  While Auyero and Swistun‟s case study of Flammable suggests a link 
between toxic uncertainty and collective inaction on contamination, the present study of 
Abra Pampa does not make that connection for two reasons.  One is that the sources of 
contamination in each place affect the identification of those “responsible” for suffering 
(which is, at least ostensibly, clearer in Abra Pampa).  Unlike Flammable, where multiple 
factories in a petrochemical compound pollute the neighborhood and surrounding area, in 
                                                 
6 Auyero and Swistun, 65. 
7 Auyero and Swistun, 6. 
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Abra Pampa there is one “agent” of industrial contamination – Metal Huasi – and one 
commonly-blamed culprit of health and environmental problems – lead – which changes 
the nature of uncertainty and has provided a common “target” for action, when it does 
occur.  A second reason why the same link between toxic uncertainty and collective 
“inaction” is not drawn in the case of Abra Pampa is the fact that there have been periods 
of mobilization around lead contamination in Abra Pampa that have sustained a core 
group of concerned, vocal residents (though they represent a slim minority) who link the 
problem of lead contamination to broader land rights struggles and opposition to mining.  
Though periods of highly-visible collective mobilization have been sporadic and short-
lived, it does not seem accurate to describe their periodic nature as indicative of inaction. 
A third element that is key to understanding the question of contamination, 
suffering, and social domination in Abra Pampa, but that is not part of the case study of 
Auyero and Swistun‟s case study, has to do with race and ethnicity.  The fact that the 
majority of Abra Pampa residents identify as Kolla, an indigenous community that has 
lived in present-day Northern Argentina and Southern Bolivia for centuries,
 
figures 
prominently in the context of environmental suffering that they face at the hands 
extractive industry activity in the province of Jujuy.  The relationship between the 
historically marginalized communities that live near and in Abra Pampa and the political 
elites that control the mining industry in Jujuy and management of the lead waste in the 
town has much to do with the perpetuation of environmental suffering there.  In the case 
of Abra Pampa, generally speaking, collective understandings of and actions on 
contamination from lead waste appear to reflect historical class and social inequality that 
are a legacy of colonial development in the area.  The fact that lead contamination has 
most often been kept a “latent” issue in Abra Pampa is, to many residents, further 
evidence that the Kolla communities living in the area are politically “forgotten” and 
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“invisible.”  It is certainly true that not all those who identify as Kolla share a common 
understanding on the extent and gravity of lead contamination, but the construction of 
uncertainty and perception of political possibilities on action toward remediation often 
reflect narratives of historical marginalization and disempowerment. 
A BRIEF NOTE ON METHODOLOGY 
This case study of toxic uncertainty in Abra Pampa outlines the ways in which 
said uncertainty is manifested, where it originates, and how it replicates structural 
inequality and discrimination between Abra Pampa residents and governmental 
institutions, as well as between Abra Pampa residents themselves.  To this end, the study 
draws on extensive interviews and excerpts from life histories that were gathered during 
the course of three visits to Argentina to conduct fieldwork on management and 
perceptions of lead contamination in Abra Pampa.  The first visit, which was as part of 
the previously mentioned fact-finding delegation of the Human Rights Clinic of the 
University of Texas School of Law, was during one week in Argentina.  During this time, 
interviews were conducted with health and government officials, lawyers, and journalists 
in Buenos Aires and San Salvador de Jujuy, and with two families living in the Barrio 12 
de Octubre in Abra Pampa.  The subsequent two visits were to conduct research that was 
mostly ethnographic in nature – one week in January, and eight weeks in Abra Pampa 
itself in June and July of 2010.  During this time, I stayed in the Barrio 12 de Octubre, the 
neighborhood which is built around a large spread of heavy metal slag, to observe the 
ways in which people interact with lead contamination and the role it plays in their 
everyday lives. 
The principal question driving ethnographic research conducted in Abra Pampa in 
January, June, and July of 2010 was to analyze how interviewed residents (selected using 
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a “snowball sampling” method) made sense of contamination – the extent to which they 
viewed it as an issue, whether it was a topic of daily conversation/concern, and how they 
related to State agencies in charge of environmental remediation.  This research was 
motivated partially by a desire to follow up on the Human Rights Clinic‟s report of 2009, 
and but also to engage more closely with the community to more thoroughly articulate 
the power dynamics inherent to the mining industry and to the proposed environmental 
remediation plan.  For this reason, the majority of my in-depth interviews were with 
residents who are among the most critical and/or vocal about the issue of lead waste in 
Abra Pampa, and their perspectives have informed what is written here to present what is 
obscured in public, “official” discourse on contamination, which is often managed with 
mining interests in mind. 
There is an obvious gender bias among the interviews I was able to conduct 
during my visits to Abra Pampa: most of them are with men.  Though I had a handful of 
extensive interviews with women, most of which are included here and are mostly with 
mothers concerned for the health of their children, many women who I approached or to 
whom I was referred would defer to their husbands, fathers, or sons as those who “knew 
more” about the issue of lead contamination, or would decline to discuss lead altogether 
for being a “political” issue.  The implications of these gendered understandings and 
framings of the issue of lead contamination would be pertinent to future study of lead 
contamination in Abra Pampa, as they likely reflect dimensions of environmental 
suffering that are under-explored here.
8
 
                                                 
8 For example, in their case study of Flammable, Auyero and Swistun note that mothers in particular “bear 
the brunt of responsibility for care and, sometimes, the brunt of the blame: lead contamination is frequently 
seen in the neighborhood as evidence of „bad mothers‟.” (Auyero and Swistun, 17).   
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For safety and privacy purposes, names of Abra Pampa residents have been 
changed and professions obscured to protect the identity of interviewees. 
OUTLINE 
The first chapter provides an overview of the issue of lead contamination in Abra 
Pampa and situates the town in its broader context of social and economic exclusion, 
drawing from one longtime resident‟s life history to construct a history and social 
overview of Abra Pampa.  It includes a chronology of major studies and reports that deal 
with the issue of lead contamination in Abra Pampa, as well an overview of instances in 
which lead and its health effects were relatively prominent topics of public discussion 
and action.  This chapter also provides details of the environmental remediation plan that 
was drafted in 2007, two decades after Metal Huasi closed. 
Chapter Two outlines the present study‟s place in existing sociological literature 
on power, environmental suffering, and collective understandings of contamination.  This 
chapter outlines major concepts on “issueness” and dimensions of power which John 
Gaventa, Steven Lukes, and Matthew Crenson have developed, which are applied here to 
the provincial and municipal governments‟ management of information and knowledge 
about contamination in Abra Pampa. It also draws heavily on Javier Auyero and Débora 
Swistun‟s case study of toxic uncertainty in Flammable, outlining the central points for 
analysis from that work that can be applied to the present study of Abra Pampa.  It 
highlights the empirical distinctions that can be drawn between the case of Abra Pampa, 
Flammable, and Lorenzo Natali‟s case study of Huelva, Spain, particularly with regard to 
the extent to which contamination is defined as an immediate threat or an actionable 
grievance. 
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Chapter Three outlines the ways in which the State – particularly the government 
of the province of Jujuy -- has managed knowledge and scientific information on the 
effects of exposure to lead waste in Abra Pampa.  It highlights some of the contradictions 
in official discourse on the gravity of lead contamination in the town, particularly since 
the inception of the environmental remediation plan in 2007.  It makes a critical 
comparison of how remediation discourse ties in with that of the lucrative mining 
industry in Argentina, and applies theory on the exercise of power as evasion of 
“issueness” to State rhetoric on lead in Abra Pampa. 
Chapter Four analyses the role of outsiders and “experts” in the definition of the 
problem of lead contamination in Abra Pampa, specifically in the role that various studies 
and interventions have played in residents‟ own understandings of the actual risks they 
face.  It emphasizes the role of health studies in residents‟ measure of their own health or 
illness due to exposure to lead, as well as the effect that the remediation process has had 
on residents‟ estimations on risk and perceptions of contamination. I also briefly analyze 
the roles my own projects -- both the human rights report and my Master‟s thesis research 
– have played in residents‟ understandings of contamination and potential solutions to 
environmental and health crises. 
Chapter Five provides an analysis of how discourse on the effects of exposure to 
lead waste often fall along class lines within Abra Pampa.  The chapter presents the 
“healthy professional” versus “sick poor” dichotomy that is present in some denials of the 
existence of suffering due to lead contamination in Abra Pampa, and that situate 
contamination in a broader narrative of recent social “decline” in the town.  It also 
presents the “flipside” of these explanations through the perspective of those who suffer 
from lead contamination, who say that their suffering is compounded by their 
socioeconomic status and lack of access to adequate health care. 
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Chapter Six offers perspectives on the struggle toward demanding recognition of 
and action on lead contamination from those who have remained consistently vocal and 
critical of the municipality of Abra Pampa and the province of Jujuy for failing to 
guarantee rights to health and a healthy environment in Abra Pampa.  It presents some of 
the obstacles and stigmatization they have faced for naming lead contamination as an 
objective health threat, as well as some of the “empirical possibilities” for positive 
change in Abra Pampa. 
The study concludes with a note on future directions for research on toxic 
uncertainty and environmental justice framing, as well as a further note on what 
theoretical and empirical avenues for change might in exist in Abra Pampa and other 
similarly highly contaminated places where “toxic uncertainty” exists. 
Above all, this case study of Abra Pampa aims to reveal how industrial 
contamination disproportionately affects those living in its centers of production.  
Through its analysis of popular uncertainty and confusion on the extent and gravity of 
lead contamination, its intention is to highlight the construction of ambiguities that 
obscure objective health threats.  The intention here is not to blame Abra Pampa residents 
for their own “confusion” or to present the “failure” of collective mobilization to emerge, 
but rather to reveal how conflicted discourses on the unfavorable aspects of extractive 
industry activity disproportionately discredit those who have the most to lose from denial 
of its human cost.  
 14 
CHAPTER 1: BACKGROUND AND HISTORY OF LEAD 
CONTAMINATION IN ABRA PAMPA 
 
Metal Huasi operated from the late 1940s until the late 1980s, but lead 
contamination has only relatively recently been a highly-public issue of contention in 
Abra Pampa, with sporadic collective mobilization around obviously visible signs of 
contamination.  When residents reflect on Metal Huasi and the issue of lead 
contamination, they often note that public manifestations of concern were highest in the 
late 1980s and again from about 2004-2007.  These periods coincide with health studies 
that had been conducted in Abra Pampa to determine the amount of lead in the blood of 
resident children, who are particularly susceptible to problems associated with lead 
contamination.   The following chapter provides a brief history of Abra Pampa, as well as 
knowledge of and action on lead contamination there, according to documentary research 
and the recollections of several lifelong residents.  Here, it is clear that much 
“uncertainty” is likely the result of outside interventions, as many remember lead 
contamination becoming a salient point of contention after health studies were conducted 
and as the result of actions taken toward proposed remediation. 
When Fernando was 18 in 1973, he moved to Abra Pampa from a small farming 
community roughly twenty kilometers away.  Like many current Abra Pampa residents, 
Fernando says, he moved to the town for work when it was no longer economically 
feasible to stay in the countryside and make a living as a farmer.  He attributes much of 
the current and past migration to Abra Pampa from surrounding rural areas to declining 
rural subsidizes and prices for agricultural goods.  “[Farming] wasn‟t profitable at all, and 
it keeps getting worse.  People are coming to Abra Pampa, abandoning their homes in the 
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countryside,” he says, noting that he has seen the population of Abra Pampa “explode” 
over the years.  
It is difficult to estimate what the population of Abra Pampa might be, largely 
because its population figures vary from person to person.  In the last national census of 
2001, the population of Abra Pampa is listed at 7,496.  Given the rate at which Abra 
Pampa has expanded, many residents estimate that the population is now around 13,000, 
though some claim there are as many as 18,000 residents. Most agree that the population 
has doubled in the past decade, however, despite the fact that in 2004 it had a staggering 
unemployment rate of 70 percent.  This figure reflects stark inequality in the region as a 
whole: the Northwestern region of Argentina has been a dubbed a “critical region,” as 60 
percent of its population lives below the poverty line (compared to 44 percent 
nationwide).
9
  In Abra Pampa, there is a general perception, which Fernando shares, that 
as the town has expanded, poverty rates have soared.  “People come here with nothing,” 
he says.  “Abra Pampa keeps growing, but only in size.  When people move here, they 
create new neighborhoods, but they‟re poor neighborhoods, on the margin, you know?” 
Many Abra Pampa residents say that the population boom and constant low rates 
of poverty have led to a host of other social problems that they list as immediate, pressing 
concerns – and lead is not usually key among them.  Many blame demographic changes 
and low employment rates for widespread problems such as alcoholism, depression, 
teenage suicide, teenage drug use, increased illness rates, and a relatively recent surge in 
drug trafficking.  These problems are compounded by the fact that social and health 
services in Abra Pampa are scarce. 
                                                 
9
 “Informe de Desarrollo Humano: Argentina después de la crisis: Un tiempo de oportunidades,”  
Programa de las NacionesUnidas para el Desarrollo, 2005, 
http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/national/latinamericathecaribbean/argentina/name,3388,en.html. 
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Fernando notes that, although many residents feel they are better off in Abra 
Pampa – which, as capital of the department of Cochinoca, serves as a regional hub for 
basic goods and health care services -- but that employment has always been scarce. 
“There isn‟t work.  Aside from teaching, working in security, in the army or the police, or 
maybe sometimes for the municipality, there aren‟t jobs here,” he says.  He notes that 
politicians always promise this will change – for example, by promoting llama 
cultivation, by promoting the insertion of women into the market to sell crafts – but that 
job opportunities continue to be scarce, informal, short-lived, and come and go with the 
seasons. 
Abra Pampa residents have also ridden the boom-and-bust cycle of the mining 
industry in Argentina.  The mountainous province of Jujuy is often referred to as the 
“mining capital of Argentina” due to its wealth of mineral reserves.  Fernando notes that 
jobs in the mining sector do represent some of the most lucrative opportunities for 
residents in the area, despite the fact that there are relatively few jobs in mining now.  
Often young men will leave for a few months at a time to work in mines in the area or 
even as far as away as Patagonia, at the opposite end of the country.  “You see all these 
new cars here?  That‟s not because there‟s money in Abra Pampa.  Those belong to the 
young miners who don‟t work here,” Fernando says, referring to vehicles that pass by his 
house.  Fluctuations in the mining industry have also had an impact in population growth 
in Abra Pampa; according to several interviews with lifelong residents, when nearby 
mines such as Pirquitas and Pan de Azúcar closed in recent decades, most of the families 
who lived near the mines moved to Abra Pampa. 
When nearby mines were functioning, Metal Huasi represented an important 
source of employment in the town because it would process lead, zinc, and silver from 
these places.  “Metal Huasi has always existed, but not always as a problem.  It was a 
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source of work,” Fernando says.  Although he never worked in the smelter, his father did.  
“I didn‟t think of it as a bad thing.  The worst thing that ever happened was that he had a 
minor eye injury there one time from a piece of hot metal.”  Fernando has a small metal 
paperweight – “It‟s probably lead,” he says with a laugh – which is about the size of a 
stick of butter and has “METAL HUASI” stamped on it sitting on a bookshelf in his 
living room.  “It‟s my souvenir,” he says.  “A lot of people used to have these.”  
Fernando, and many other lifelong Abra Pampa residents, recall Metal Huasi having a 
strong presence in the community for years.  In addition to employing fifty to sixty men 
at a time – a relatively high proportion of the population – for many years Metal Huasi 
sponsored an athletic club and soccer team, children would play on its grounds, and 
young men would take pieces of the waste that accumulated and sell them to local 
jewelers, especially if they believed it contained silver. 
Like Fernando, many lifelong residents of Abra Pampa share positive – or at least 
ambivalent – memories of Metal Huasi, in which lead contamination or hazards related to 
work there was never openly discussed.  However, in recounting the history of Metal 
Huasi in the community, many residents cite contradictory facts on public opinion and 
awareness of contamination.  At the same time that they state that Metal Huasi was “just 
a source of work” or that it was “never a problem”, they will often mention how difficult 
it was to breathe when Metal Huasi was operating, since thick, black clouds of smoke 
would billow above the town at these times: 
“It was horrible – it would burn, your nose would hurt, you would have the worst 
headaches when those clouds were there.” 
“When Metal Huasi operated, it would rain lead and corrode everything around 
it.” 
“When the smelter functioned, the entire town would be closed in a cloud of 
lead.” 
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Fernando lived half a block from Metal Huasi from the time he moved to Abra 
Pampa until about five years ago, when he moved to the Barrio 12 de Octubre, just a few 
blocks away. Despite noting that he and his neighbors did not think of Metal Huasi as a 
problem, he too notes how his throat and nose would burn when Metal Huasi was 
operating, how clothes hung out to dry “would sometimes come back totally black,” and 
how his parents and, later, wife and children would complain of bone aches which later 
were believed to be a result of breathing in lead particles.  “We didn‟t always know that 
lead was harmful,” he says, “We first found out that it was not because there was 
information about it or because the doctors talked about it, but we just thought so out of 
intuition.” 
In addition to spewing black “clouds of lead”, Metal Huasi continually polluted 
Abra Pampa through the accumulation of heavy metal waste – predominantly lead – 
throughout three major areas of town.  In addition to the Metal Huasi site, which is in the 
center of the town and where a towering pile of lead often referred to as el cerro  or el 
cerrito stood for decades, lead waste was also spread in what is now the Barrio 12 de 
Octubre, a few blocks east of the smelter site, and was used to dam the Arroyo 
Tabladitas, about a kilometer away from the town.  The maps below provide a visual 
representation of the three sites where heavy metal waste accumulated while Metal Huasi 
was operating, most of which remains exposed to the air today.   
The first map is of the entire town of Abra Pampa, with two major sites of waste 
pileup labeled in red.  For years, the most strikingly visible portion of the waste (the 
cerrito) was at the Metal Huasi site, some three blocks north of the town‟s central plaza 
(“A” on the map).  The second map shows the Northeastern quadrant of the map of Abra 
Pampa, providing a closer look at where the waste had accumulated for decades.  The 
lighter-colored portions of the map – the houses that appear white and in smaller-shaped 
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blocks here – represent newer sections of the town that have mostly been built in the last 
decade, when Abra Pampa‟s population approximately doubled.  It is important to note 
that these lighter areas of the map show that Abra Pampa is growing around and toward 
waste – that which is clustered in the Barrio 12 de Octubre (the irregular shape outlined 
in red) and near the Arroyo Tabladitas (in the upper right-hand corner), and toward the 
town‟s open-pit landfill (outlined in blue in the lower right-hand corner). 
 
 
Figure 1: Map of Abra Pampa.   
Lead waste has accumulated at the Metal Huasi site (North of the Central Plaza), in the 
Barrio 12 de Octubre (East of Metal Huasi), and at the Arroyo Tabladitas (not pictured 
here, but Northeast of the town).  (Image courtesy of Google Maps). 
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Figure 2: Locations of Waste in Relation to Residential Areas 
“A” = Central Plaza, and lead waste is outlined in red.  The square North of the plaza is 
where Metal Huasi operated, the irregular shape in the middle is waste in the Barrio 12 de 
Octubre, and in the upper right-hand corner is the Arroyo Tabladitas, where lead dammed 
a river.  The blue in the lower left-hand corner outlines the town‟s open-pit landfill.  
(Image courtesy of Google Maps) 
 
Residents have continually been exposed to contamination in the air, soil, and 
water supply, both as a result of this waste‟s exposure to the elements and from pollution 
released into the air while Metal Huasi was still in operation.  Lead commonly enters the 
body through ingestion and respiration, and contamination is exacerbated, and facilitated 
by, Abra Pampa's climate.  Seasonally heavy rains cause heavy metal toxins to leech into 
the soil beneath large deposits of metal waste, contaminating the groundwater, and 
residue from the waste can eventually become ingested if people touch or otherwise come 
into contact with it.  It is important to note that for decades, this waste has been easily 
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accessible to Abra Pampa residents – many adults recall times when they or their children 
climbed on and rolled down the pile of waste at Metal Huasi, and the municipality 
installed goal posts on top of waste in the Barrio 12 de Octubre, which became the “home 
field” of one of the town‟s soccer clubs.  Additionally, the municipality began selling 
plots of land to people in the Barrio 12 de Octubre that is adjacent to, and in some cases 
on top of, lead waste that had accumulated there throughout the late 1990s and early 
2000s. 
Among the most harmful components of the lead waste that remains are those that 
are not easily visible, however, and are not confined to piles of metal that accumulated 
over the years.   Humos blancos (in English, literally “white smoke”) are fine dust-like 
particles of oxidized lead that accumulate on top of the waste, and are easily blown 
throughout Abra Pampa on the high plains‟ characteristically strong winds.  These 
particles, once airborne, are easily breathed in and deposited inside or around houses, in 
some cases several blocks from sites where heavy metal waste was originally deposited.  
Additionally, seasonally strong rains both allow for lead to seep into the soil and create 
runoff that deposits humos blancos and other lead particles as rainwater deposits them 
through neighborhood streets. 
As can be seen from the anecdotes that Fernando and other Abra Pampa residents 
offered (described a few pages prior), when people reflect on their first “intuitions” that 
Metal Huasi‟s operations may have been harmful to their health, they do not mention the 
humos blancos or the waste which piled up around town.  What they do remember is how 
suppressive the black clouds of pollution that billowed above town were, and it was 
around these clouds that residents mobilized in the late 1980s.  During this time, dozens 
of residents rallied around the clouds rose above Metal Huasi, holding town-hall 
meetings with the mayor and with Metal Huasi owners to demand closure of the plant.  
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All interviewed residents who were living in Abra Pampa at the time remember a major 
corte de ruta in May of 1986 – some claim it was the town‟s first – when residents 
blocked a major highway that divides the town to call attention to the pollution and 
demand closure of Metal Huasi. 
At the end of the same year, health professionals from the provincial capital of 
Jujuy released the first study on high levels of lead in the blood of children aged six and 
twelve years old, focusing on the pile of lead in the town center.  The study reveals that 
children living within 200 meters of the Metal Huasi site had blood-lead levels exceeding 
20 µg/dL (micrograms per deciliter), twice the amount deemed “acceptable” by 
international standards.
10
  Of 124 six-year-olds sampled, 100 exhibited blood-lead levels 
between 10 and 50 µg/dL, and of 102 twelve-year-olds sampled, 90 had blood-lead levels 
ranging from 10-54 µg/dL. The study concludes by advocating for further clinical studies 
for the diagnosis and treatment of affected children in Abra Pampa, generalizing from its 
findings that “1,970 children under 15 years of age are exposed to the same risk.”11 
Populations that are most vulnerable to the effects of exposure to lead 
contamination are children and the malnourished.  Once ingested, lead acts similarly to 
calcium in the human body.  It deposits itself and accumulates in bone marrow and is 
circulated throughout the body in the bloodstream, leading to irreversible organ damage.  
Common symptoms of lead poisoning include problems with vision, memory loss, 
behavioral disorders, brain damage, and aches in bones, problems which many Abra 
Pampa residents claim affect them.  The World Health Organization (WHO) has set the 
                                                 
10 Adrián Canelada, María Teresita Mochietti de Maldana, Sara R. Barberis, María Elena Marcoleri de 
Olguín, Eduardo Emilio Joaquín, & Pilar Navarro, “Investigación epidemiológica sobre contaminación por 
plomo en la localidad de Abra Pampa, en relación con una fundición de plomo ubicada en esa ciudad.,” 
Ministerio de Salud y Bienestar de la Provincia de Jujuy, 1986. 
11 Canelada et al, 35. 
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international standard for “acceptable” levels of lead in the blood at 10 µg/dL, though 
recently some members of the medical community have advocated lowering this figure to 
5 µg/dL, citing adverse effects on IQ and bone growth at this level.
12
  For this reason, 
published studies on lead contamination in Abra Pampa have focused on blood-lead 
levels mostly in children aged 6-12 years. 
The exact dates for Metal Huasi‟s closure are disputed in the town, as the plant 
changed owners several times in the late 1980s and would periodically close and then re-
open for a few months at a time (though not as a direct result of residents‟ protest.)  Some 
residents remember a hailstorm in 1993 that closed Metal Huasi definitively, when wind, 
rain, and ice caused the roof to cave in and rendered several other pieces of its structure 
useless.  “Then after that, I don‟t know, nobody talked about Metal Huasi anymore,” one 
of them said.  Throughout the 1990s, homes continued to be built toward and around the 
waste in the Barrio 12 de Octubre. A soccer field was installed on top of that waste, and 
children played on top of the large pile in the town center. 
In the 2000s, the lead waste again became defined as a problem, this time perhaps 
partially as a result of multiple health studies that found high levels of lead in the blood 
of children living in Abra Pampa.  When residents reflect on lead contamination, they 
remember a sustained period of protest from about 2004 to 2007, a period of time in 
which the Toxicology Service of the Provincial Health Ministry and the INQA group of 
the National University of Jujuy published the findings of their studies, and in which 
dozens of families became parties to a class-action suit against the municipality through 
the law firm of provincial political representative Riad Quintar, who hired a private team 
                                                 
12 “Impact of Lead-Contaminated Soil on Public Health,”  Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 
1982; Todd A. Jusko, Charles R. Henderson, Jr., Bruce Lanphear, Deborah A. Cory-Slechta, Patrick J. 
Parsons, and Richard I. Canfield, “Blood Lead Concentrations < 10 µg/dL and Child Intelligence at 6 years 
of age,” Environmental Health Perspectives 116, No. 2 (2008). 
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of doctors to take blood samples from residents (largely those living in the Barrio 12 de 
Octubre) to determine their degree of lead poisoning.  Interviewed residents remember 
the events differently, but many attribute growth in awareness of and concern over the 
health effects of lead waste, rather than Metal Huasi‟s operations, to  “lo de los estudios”  
-- a commonly-used phrase that vaguely refers to this time period in which various 
studies were conducted, without naming a specific study or specific year: 
“For a while, nobody talked about lead.  Then came lo de los estudios, and 
suddenly everybody was talking about lead again.” 
“I didn‟t know that pile was harmful until lo de los estudios.  Let‟s see, what year 
did they start?  2000?  2005?  No, 2003, I think.” 
“In 2005 we started with lo de los estudios, and everyone was involved again.  
Now we know life here is dangerous.” 
The first of the studies that was published during this time was conducted in 2004 
and published in 2006.  The Toxicology Service of the Province of Jujuy took blood 
samples from a total of 144 children aged 5-12 years, who lived within concentric 
distances of the Metal Huasi site near the town center, and concluded that “40 percent of 
the blood-lead levels were higher than those recommended by the Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention (CDC) for the child population, and therefore those children run a 
higher risk of suffering different types of disabilities.”13  The average blood-lead level of 
this group of children was 33.2 µg/dL, slightly higher than three times that deemed 
“acceptable”, with a range of 18.4 µg/dL to 52.7 µg/dL, a point at which severe problems 
with cognitive and physical development are apparent. 
                                                 
13 Sara Barberis, Adriana Piñeiro, and Clara Magdalena López.  “Estudio sobre contaminación ambiental 
por plomo en niños de la localidad de Abra Pampa (Jujuy-Argentina).”  Ministerio de Bienestar Social de la 
Provincia de Jujuy, 2006. 6.  Original: “El 40% de los valores de PbS realizados estuvieron por encima de 
los recomendados por el CDC para la población infantil y por ende esos niños presentan un alto riesgo de 
sufrir distintos tipos de discapacidades.” 
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The second major health study to appear during this time was the notorious INQA 
study, which was conducted in 2006 and whose results were published in 2007.  This 
study revealed that an estimated 80 percent of 234 children living within 500 meters of 
Metal Huasi had levels of lead in their blood higher than 5 µg/dL,
14
 which, although 
lower than the “traditional” standard of 10 µg/dL, is a point at which many in the medical 
community agree adverse psychological and physical effects begin to appear.  This value 
has been contested in subsequent discussions with government officials working in the 
province of Jujuy, but the INQA group affirmed in interviews in June of 2010 that several 
countries have already lowered their standard for measuring harmful amounts of lead in 
the blood to 5 µg/dL, and wanted to follow that example. 
In addition to calling attention to high quantities of lead in the blood of children 
living near Metal Huasi, the INQA group also brought higher attention to the reasons why 
lead continued to be a problem in Abra Pampa by emphasizing the idea of the 
“bioavailability” of lead in Metal Huasi waste.  Bioavailability refers to the amount of 
lead that the human body can absorb in a given physical quantity, which in this case 
largely refers to humos blancos that can be breathed in or ingested as a result of contact 
with things that have come into contact with lead particles that have been blown or 
otherwise deposited around town.  The INQA group emphasized in its report and stressed 
in several “follow-up” meetings with Abra Pampa residents that children in particular run 
a higher risk of exposure to lead poisoning because of their tendency to put objects in 
their mouths, including dirt that may be contaminated. 
                                                 
14 5 ug/dL, the point at which many in the medical community believe adverse mental health effects are 
visible.  “Evaluación del riesgo químico por metales tóxicos en Abra Pampa, asignando magnitudes y 
probabilidades de efecto adversos de la contaminación en el ambiente y la población infantile expuesta,” 
Grupo de Investigación Química Aplicada, Universidad Nacional de Jujuy. 2007. 
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In the time immediately following the publication of the INQA report, residents 
remember a “peak” of public protest around the issue.  In July of 2007, dozens of 
residents took part in a march from Abra Pampa to provincial capital San Salvador de 
Jujuy to call attention to the issue of lead poisoning, couching it in a general frame of 
social exclusion of Kolla communities.  Many residents also remember the priest of the 
local Catholic church, Padre Jesús Olmedo, leading a series of protests on governmental 
inaction on the issue of lead contamination.  In one of these protests, he tied himself to 
the pile of lead in the town center in an act of symbolic “crucifixion”, and others who had 
taken part of these protests painted slogans such as “Murderers” and “This is killing our 
sons and daughters” on the smelter‟s walls.   
During this time, Abra Pampa began to appear in national media as well.  In 
September of 2007, an article in Clarín, one of Argentina‟s major daily newspapers, 
published a subsequently widely-referenced article affirming in its headline that “In Abra 
Pampa the majority of children have lead in the blood”, citing the INQA report as its 
basis.
15
  A one-minute short film titled “Invisibles” was featured as part of the public 
service announcement series “Un minuto por mis derechos” (“One minute for my 
rights”), in which a child‟s voice and drawings describe the story of a girl who faints in 
school, then learns that lead in her town had been there since long before she was born.  It 
references the INQA study‟s findings that 81% of children like her had high levels of 
lead in their blood.
16
 
It is important to note that all of the publicized studies from 1986, 2004, and 2006 
focus on Metal Huasi – making it and its adjacent towering pile of lead a photo-op of 
                                                 
15 Sibila Camps,  “En Abra Pampa la mayoría de los chicos tienen plomo en la sangre,” Clarín, 2 
September 2007, http://edant.clarin.com/diario/2007/09/02/sociedad/s-04215.htm. 
16 “Invisibles,” Un Minuto Por Mis Derechos, 2008, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jJ6cFuqIuGQ. 
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sorts for the question of lead contamination in Abra Pampa.  This pile was haphazardly 
removed in late 2008 and 2009, however, and all that remains at the eerie Metal Huasi 
site are rusty, broken pieces of its original structure that have largely been left untouched 
since it closed and which clang together on Abra Pampa‟s characteristically windy 
afternoons. Although the strikingly visual pile of lead waste is gone, it is equally 
important to highlight that contamination itself is not – a significant, ground-level spread 
of lead waste remains untouched in the Barrio 12 de Octubre, and humos blancos cover 
the ground at the Metal Huasi site and at the Arroyo Tabladitas. 
Ostensibly, lead that has been removed so far was done as part of a remediation 
plan that the federal government of Argentina drafted in November of 2007.  
Remediation was to be carried out using part of a loan from the Inter-American 
Development Bank (IDB), earmarked for promoting clean, sustainable practices in the 
mining sector.  The IDB program is divided into two subprograms – “Promotion of Clean 
Production” and “Environmental Development in Mining”, and Abra Pampa‟s 
remediation project falls into the second “subprogram”.  Approximately US$14 million 
are allocated for “supporting environmental management in degraded mining areas” in 
Argentina under this subprogram, which is to be supervised and carried out by the federal 
mining secretariat and provincial-level officials in a division of the mining secretariat 
known as GEAMIN (Gestión Ambiental Minera; Environmental Development in 
Mining).
17
  GEAMIN was created to promote sustainable and responsible mining 
practices in Argentina.  To date, however, it is unclear to what extent GEAMIN, or any 
public institution, has proactively overseen any environmental remediation plan in Abra 
Pampa.  According to the original remediation plan (and several interviews  with 
                                                 
17 “Propuesta de Prestamo, Programa de Gestión Ambiental para una Producción Sustentable en el Sector 
Productivo (AR-L1026),” Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo, Argentina. 2007. 
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members of the federal and provincial mining secretariats) all of the areas of lead waste 
would be fenced off, lead would be removed, and other incidental cleanup operations – 
such as washing the exterior of buildings to remove lead dust – would be completed by 
the end of 2010.  
While so far the 15,000-ton pile of lead has been removed from the town center, a 
wire fence has been placed around lead waste in the Barrio 12 de Octubre, and waste has 
been taken from where it walled the Arroyo Tabladitas, no other concrete steps have been 
taken toward remediation since early 2009.  It should be emphasized that even those steps 
toward remediation that have taken place so far have been under the auspices of the semi-
private (and totally intransparent) Cámara Minera (“Chamber of Mining”) of the 
province of Jujuy, which is comprised of representatives of various mining companies 
that operate in the province.  The Chamber of Mining took waste away hastily, without 
first consulting the community or warning neighbors of precautions to be taken while 
waste was being removed from the town center, and it may have actually exacerbated 
contamination in the area surrounding the smelter by not following environmental 
precautions.  Additionally, there is visual evidence that waste that was bagged and then 
removed from the Arroyo Tabladitas was also done haphazardly, as several shreds of the 
bags and humos blancos still cover parts of the ground at this site, suggesting that some 
of them had ripped in transit and then not cleaned up. Waste that has been taken away to 
date has been stored in the nearby Mina Aguilar, which is owned by the Swiss mining 
company Glencore and operates a functioning lead smelter in Palpalá, roughly 250 
kilometers from Abra Pampa. 
The following pictures show what the Metal Huasi site looked like before and 
after waste was removed in late 2008 and early 2009.  The photo on the left shows Metal 
Huasi in August of 2008 (photo courtesy of Matthew Wooten).  The photo on the right 
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shows Metal Huasi in April of 2009, three months after the 15,000-ton pile of lead was 
removed.
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Metal Huasi Before and After Remediation 
The following photos of the Arroyo Tabladitas site show what has been left after 
lead that had dammed a river was bagged up and taken away in late 2008.  The photo on 
the left shows a shred of one of the bags that was left behind, and the photo on the right 
shows a resident standing on a ramp that had been used to load the bags on to a truck that 
was also left at the site. 
Figure 4: Humos blancos and parts of machinery left at Arroyo Tabladitas. 
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Abra Pampa residents were led to believe that environmental remediation would 
have been completed by the end of 2010, and that it would entail evaluation of the extent 
and gravity of lead contamination for subsequent removal of waste from the three major 
sites where it was left after Metal Huasi closed and from any other area deemed 
“contaminated.”   
 
 
Figure 5: Humos blancos at Metal Huasi 
Humos blancos cover the ground at Metal Huasi, spilling beneath the fence that has been 
constructed around its perimeter 
Waste in the Barrio 12 de Octubre, which is adjacent to and in some cases directly 
beneath several homes that have been built in Abra Pampa in the last decade, is still very 
much a part of residents‟ daily interactions with their environment.  Although the 
provincial government installed a chain-link fence around this football field-sized spread 
of ground-level waste as part of an initial phase in the remediation process in 2007, it has 
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not limited residents‟ exposure to toxins it contains.  The fence has been cut in several 
places so that residents can walk through the waste to get from one side of the 
neighborhood to the other, and the municipal government has installed two goal posts for 
a soccer field on top of this waste. The fence does little to keep humos blancos from 
spreading throughout Abra Pampa by wind or rain runoff.  In fact, humos blancos are still 
prevalent at the Metal Huasi and Arroyo Tabladitas sites, and are believed to be among 
the most dangerous particles from the Metal Huasi waste.  While the bulk of the solid 
waste appears to be gone, the ground is still covered with a layer of lead dust that can 
easily be breathed in or deposited around town.  
 
 
 
Figure 6: Lead waste in the Barrio 12 de Octubre
The remediation process, initially hailed in the local press as a response to a 
“historic request” in 2008,18 is simultaneously a source of hope, anxiety, disdain, and 
                                                 
18 “Terminó traslado de pasivo ambiental de Metal Huasi,” El Tribuno de Jujuy, 31 Dec. 2008. 
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confusion on actual environmental risk that lead waste poses.  Governmental agencies 
charged with managing lead waste removal in Abra Pampa have provided little 
substantive information on progress of remediation since the pile of waste was removed 
from the town center, and local media coverage often diverts attention away from public 
criticism of the plan, sometimes by explicitly discrediting independent investigation on 
the effects of lead contamination.
19
   
In January of 2010, the provincial government hired CESEL S.A., a private 
Peruvian engineering firm, to act as a consultant for carrying out the rest of the 
remediation plan.  A team of scientists from CESEL worked in Abra Pampa from 
February until April of 2010, taking samples of soil, water, and air to measure amounts of 
potential toxins left in them.  The company has operated under the pretext of 
transparency and citizen participation, and created a Web site that ostensibly promotes 
“dialogue and establishes a standing channel of communication.”20 Few people in Abra 
Pampa, however, are aware of the site‟s existence, and one interviewed woman who had 
seen it noted the abundance of information that is more explicit about what will or should 
happen than on results of studies that have been conducted.  “Hablan mucho sin decir 
nada,” she remarked, encapsulating a theme heard in many discussions with Abra Pampa 
residents.  “They talk a lot without saying anything.  I thought they started [remediation] 
when they took the mountain away.  Now they say remediation is only „about to start‟. 
When are they going to tell us if we‟re contaminated?  When will they take it all away?” 
                                                 
19 See  “Bellone se reunió con representantes de la Universidad de Texas por contaminación.” 
20 “Bienvenida,” Abra Pampa Remedia, CESEL Ingenieros, SA.  http://www.abrapamparemedia.com. 
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Figure 7: 12 de Octubre Waste  
Donkeys graze on top of Metal Huasi waste in 
Barrio 12 de Octubre.   
 
 
 
       Figure 8: 12 de Octubre Fence  
Residents have cut the fence around 
12 de Octubre waste, using it as a 
shortcut across the neighborhood. 
 
When analyzing toxic uncertainty in Abra Pampa, it is important to highlight that 
its emergence seems to be linked to the multiple interventions of outsiders, and there did 
not appear to be as much “confusion” or knowledge of lead until around the time that that 
plant closed and outside actors began to disclose health study results and plan 
remediation.  This is important to note because literature on power and uncertainty in 
contaminated environments, the topic of the next chapter, names the State as an important 
agent in defining or negating contamination as a problem.  In Abra Pampa, the 
interactive, constructed nature of uncertainty and confusion is clear, due to the timing of 
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the proliferation of multiple discourses on contamination.  The resulting struggle to 
define the extent to which lead is or is not a serious problem, as well as the likelihood 
that it will be cleaned up and affected residents will be treated, reveals underlying 
political power dimensions that both create and capitalize on uncertainty.  
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CHAPTER 2: POWER AND UNCERTAINTY: THEORETICAL 
APPROACHES 
The case of Abra Pampa can be understood as a reflection of historical power 
imbalances and inequality in the region, and current discourse of residents and State 
officials
21
 on lead often reflects these inequities. Given its historical context of 
marginalization, ties with the powerful mining industry, and long silence on the issue of 
lead in the town, analysis of the case of Abra Pampa is couched in sociological literature 
on the exercise of power of dominant political actors and on two ethnographic studies of 
“toxic uncertainty” that analyze how residents of highly-contaminated areas understand 
and discuss their environment.  It draws heavily on Auyero and Swistun‟s definition of 
toxic uncertainty as “a way of experiencing toxic suffering that is shaped by…the 
interacting „invisible elbows‟…of external power forces and of everyday routine power 
struggles.”22 Since this case study provides an overview of how (and whether) dominant 
political institutions and Abra Pampa residents define lead as an issue, this chapter will 
provide a brief literature review of the major questions posed in literature on power 
(particularly as it relates to agenda-setting) and on environmental suffering itself. 
Analysis of the intersections of State and community-level discourse on 
remediation grapples with questions put forth in conceptualizations of power by Steven 
Lukes, Matthew Crenson, and John Gaventa.  These authors have conceptualized the 
“three-dimensional” aspects of power (outlined in Lukes‟ Power: A Radical View), in 
particular to explain how it is manifested subtly in situations of “latent conflict.”  Lukes 
                                                 
21 In this case, “State officials” generally refers to government officials in the mining and health sectors in 
the government of the province of Jujuy, as well as the municipality of Abra Pampa, who ostensibly 
manage the health and environmental planning in Abra Pampa.  Although we will see in the following 
chapter that “State” discourse is not monolithic, these sectors have been chosen for analysis for their 
agenda-setting powers. 
22 Auyero and Swistun, p. 6. 
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defines a “three-dimensional view” of power as one that considers “the many ways in 
which potential issues are kept out of politics, whether through the operation of social 
forces and institutional practices or through individuals‟ decisions,”23 as opposed to 
views of power which hinge mostly on behavioral explanations for observable conflict.  
The third-dimensional view of power, according to Lukes, is based on “latent conflict,” 
understood as a “contradiction between the interests of those exercising power and the 
real interests of those they exclude.”24  In the third-dimensional view, power is not only 
something that dominant actors exercise to coerce people to act a certain way, but that 
operates effectively through the “(attempted or successful) securing of people‟s 
compliance by overcoming or averting their opposition.”25  In the case of Abra Pampa, 
this contradiction and exclusion of interests is reflected in mining interests‟ denial of 
health consequences of extractive industry activity. 
In their respective studies on air pollution in suburban Chicago and on poverty 
and mining in Appalachia, Crenson and Gaventa speak to Lukes‟ “third-dimensional” 
view of power in their analyses of how it is manifested in politics of health and 
environmental hazards.  Crenson‟s work parts from the basic question of why some cities 
seem to exhibit “less concern” over air pollution than others, and his explanation lies in 
conceptualizing “issueness.”  As the name implies, issueness is a concept that explains 
the extent to which a topic becomes an “issue,” something that has been placed on a 
political agenda and which is “ripe for authoritative resolution.”26 The issueness of 
contamination, Crenson argues, is related to the extent to which leaders take public 
                                                 
23 Steven Lukes, Power: A Radical View  New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 28.  
24 Lukes, 28. 
25 Lukes, 34. 
26 Matthew A. Crenson, The Un-Politics of Air Pollution: A Study of Non-Decisionmaking in the Cities 
(Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1971), 29. 
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positions on air pollution.  Presumably, “the activities of these [formal leaders] and the 
organizations that they head will reflect positiontaking in the community at large.”27  In 
other words, the more a topic is discussed publicly in the political sphere, the more a 
community may consider it an “issue” at the grassroots level.   
Gaventa takes a related position in his study of inequality and injustice in a 
mining town near the Cumberland Gap, in which he asks “not why rebellion occurs in a 
„democracy‟ but why, in the face of massive inequalities, it does not.”28  As in Abra 
Pampa and Flammable, the community in question in Gaventa‟s work is both conscious 
of and, in many cases, upset about injustices they believe they face.  However, the 
existence of these grievances – though widespread – does not necessarily translate into 
widespread collective action.  Gaventa uses Lukes‟ three-dimensional view to provide 
potential explanations for this phenomenon: in the second-dimensional view, he says, 
“expression of politically latent grievances is found to be blocked by institutional 
practices” such as elite control and exclusion of the region in question.29  Perhaps a more 
nuanced understanding of the exercise of power in this community, Gaventa argues, is 
offered in the third-dimensional approach: that “power serves to maintain prevailing 
order of inequality not only through institutional barriers but also through the shaping of 
beliefs about the order‟s legitimacy or immutability.”30  In this case, not only the actions 
of elite institutions themselves, but the perception of these institutions “from below” is 
what perpetuates social domination. 
                                                 
27 Crenson, 95. 
28 John Gaventa, Power and Powerlessness: Quiescence and Rebellion in an Appalachian Valley (Urbana: 
University of Illinois Press, 1980), vi.   
29 Gaventa, 41. 
30 Gaventa, 42. 
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These three perspectives are informative to the case study of Abra Pampa 
because, in addition to examining the ways in which state officials and the media have 
managed the “issueness” of lead contamination and their own authority on it, it also 
posits that residents‟ own beliefs about contamination reflect, to varying degrees, the 
ways in which outsiders have managed and defined the issue.  In Abra Pampa, an 
apparently objective health threat (lead contamination) has historically been a “latent 
concern,” and state impermeability and contradiction on the issue have shaped both 
public opinion on the extent and gravity of the contamination and residents‟ own beliefs 
about the possibilities for the State to effect change.  To varying degrees, these 
perspectives point to the recognition or misrecognition of the State‟s framing of issues as 
crucial to citizen consciousness of the dangers associated with environmental 
contamination, and whether this consciousness will translate to “issueness” at the 
grassroots level.   
Ethnographic accounts of “toxic uncertainty” in Abra Pampa reveal the 
contradictory ways in which residents engage with outsiders‟ definitions of lead 
contamination, as well as divisions among residents on whether lead contamination is an 
“issue” or an actionable grievance.  To answer some of the questions posed in the 
literature on power and issueness, namely how residents‟ perceptions of dominant 
institutions shape their “compliance” with definitions of risk, whether public political 
discourse shapes these definitions, and whether an apparent lack of protest on an issue 
correlates with a lack of political discourse, it is necessary to examine how people engage 
with outsider/dominant actor frames, interventions, and inaction on lead contamination. 
The concept of toxic uncertainty, as Auyero and Swistun define it, is most 
applicable to the case of Abra Pampa for its emphasis on the construction of residents‟ 
contradictory understandings of their environment vis-à-vis interactions with dominant 
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institutions and with each other.  As in Flammable, there is no common agreement among 
Abra Pampa residents on the extent and gravity of contamination, but often the reasons 
for these disagreements are the result of contradictory information and even blanket 
denial of problems associated with lead that come from outside actors (particularly 
government institutions).  Auyero and Swistun name “widespread uncertainty” in 
Flammable as a “product of a labor of confusion performed, not necessarily intentionally 
and less so in a coordinated way, by a series of interconnected actors.”31  These actors‟ 
discourses reify, deny, and complicate intuitions and beliefs on the effects and sources of 
contamination, contributing to an overall lack of a shared understanding of contamination 
in the community. 
Auyero and Swistun describe four manifestations of “toxic uncertainty” in 
Flammable, in which residents‟ testimonies exhibit contradictions on specific sources, 
effects, and seriousness of environmental contamination.  These manifestations – 
misinformation, shifted responsibility, denial, and blindness
32
 -- are partially responsible 
for the “recursive relationship” between collective understandings and joint action in 
highly contaminated communities.
33
  In this case, Auyero and Swistun argue, tenuous 
collective understandings may explain a lack of joint action.  These understandings are, 
in turn, socially produced – a result of interactions with multiple discourses and ways of 
framing the issue of contamination.   
                                                 
31 Auyero and Swistun, 94. 
32 Auyero and Swistun, 91.   
Misinformation: “as when residents assume that lead contamination is clustered in the poorest section of 
the shantytown or when they assert that „lead is produced by the coal-processing plant.‟”   
Shifted responsibility: “as when respondents argue that poor parenting is responsible for high levels of 
lead contamination.” 
Denial: “as when residents actually challenge existing data showing that environmental pollution has 
reached toxic levels or when they use their own healthy bodies to deny serious contamination.” 
Blindness: “as when neighbors ignore their own risk perpetuating land-filling practices.” 
33 Auyero and Swistun, 130-131. 
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The present study draws heavily on this notion by pointing to the government of 
Jujuy and the municipality of Abra Pampa‟s denial, the overall political “nonissueness” 
of lead contamination, and the confused “official stance” toward lead contamination in 
Abra Pampa through discourse on remediation.  Officials working in development and 
health policy assure that they are making a concerted effort to deal with lead 
contamination while simultaneously downplaying or negating risks that other 
independent “outside actors” have professed.  Their attempted monopoly on “legitimate” 
(though contradictory) knowledge feeds into Abra Pampa residents‟ own uncertainties 
toward lead contamination.  Auyero and Swistun make a point in their study of 
Flammable that is equally applicable in Abra Pampa.  Part of the reason why State 
discourse perpetuates so much confusion is that contamination is often treated “as a 
problem whose solution is always someone else‟s responsibility.”34 This, combined with 
the fact that the fact that the State is “simultaneously confused, neglectful, and bold” 
leads to uncertainty in Flammable itself.
35
 
Auyero and Swistun‟s notes on time and waiting in Flammable are also applicable 
to the case of Abra Pampa, and will be taken up here.  Auyero and Swistun note that 
pollution in Flammable has taken on a “slow incubation processs” – in that it was not 
“abruptly imposed” on the neighborhood36 -- which affects how people view the sources 
and effects of contamination.  Without a concrete reference point for how and when 
contamination began (unlike cases in which explosions, leaks, and other industrial or 
natural disasters are framed as the cause for grievances), residents may not be as likely to 
clearly define it as hazardous or life-threatening.  As is seen a bit in the first chapter and 
                                                 
34 Auyero and Swistun, 100. 
35 Auyero and Swistun, 101. 
36 Auyero and Swistun, 60. 
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as will be explored in the second chapter, a similar “slow incubation process” has taken 
place with Metal Huasi‟s lead waste.  For decades, Abra Pampa residents have simply 
coexisted with the waste, and it has long been a part of the town‟s physical landscape 
before it was described as an objective health threat.  This has likely contributed to some 
residents‟ skepticism of its actual risk, and presents challenges for those hoping to 
organize collectively on the harm that lead ostensibly causes. 
The second temporal component of Auyero and Swistun‟s work – that taken up 
with its engagement with the concept of waiting – is also seen in Abra Pampa and 
presents challenges for the framing of lead waste as an immediate health threat.  In 
Auyero and Swistun‟s case study, Flammable residents are said to “live in a time oriented 
to and by others” – legal appointments and health tests are delayed, they await an “always 
imminent” relocation – “and while they wait, the doubts about what others are 
presumably doing on their behalf grow.  These doubts eventually become self-doubts 
about their own (individual and collective) power.”37  In their subjection of time to 
others, “neighbors end up relying for solutions on the same agents who are responsible 
for their suffering.”38  Abra Pampa residents have also been subject to waiting for a 
solution – in the form of environmental remediation – from the same entities that are 
responsible for industrial contamination there in the first place – the mining sector.  
However, in Abra Pampa, resistance to denial of contamination (though not widespread) 
constantly criticizes these institutions for their political inaction, and actively discredits 
them for such. 
In many ways, the case of Abra Pampa almost synonymous with that of 
Flammable – in that confusion and uncertainty are a result of contradictory discourses 
                                                 
37 Auyero and Swistun, 129. 
38 Auyero and Swistun, 136. 
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and interventions (mostly on the part of the State), that there is no widespread 
understanding of the extent and gravity of lead contamination, and that until relatively 
recently lead contamination has not been defined as an “issue”.  However, several 
empirical differences emerge, briefly discussed here and in greater depth in the 
conclusion, that present additional consideration for some of the conclusions that Auyero 
and Swistun draw on the formulation of collective understandings of contamination, as 
well as their potential links to collective action.  The first is that in Abra Pampa, the 
source of contamination is known, and acknowledged as the lead present in the heavy 
metal waste that Metal Huasi left behind.  In Flammable, Auyero and Swistun note that, 
in their reconstructions of the history of the shantytown, residents display a “lack of 
certainty about the origins of pollution.”39  In other words, part of the toxic uncertainty 
displayed in Flammable stems from the belief that multiple toxins are affecting residents‟ 
livelihoods, and that they started doing so at an indeterminable period in the shantytown‟s 
history.  Auyero and Swistun‟s interviews with Flammable residents reflect a belief that 
the soil in the town was filled with “„all kinds of poisons‟”,40 making it more difficult to 
assign blame for contamination and to determine risk from exposure to toxins.  Though 
lead is perhaps most commonly blamed as the culprit for many health problems in Abra 
Pampa among critics, most of the uncertainty lies over the actual extent and gravity of the 
contamination there. 
A second difference between Flammable and Abra Pampa is the fact that, unlike 
in Flammable, in Abra Pampa the industrial source of contamination is no longer in 
operation.  While some mention of opposition to Metal Huasi‟s pollution while it was 
still operating has been made here, the main focus of this case study of Abra Pampa is on 
                                                 
39 Ibid, p. 56. 
40 Ibid, p. 55. 
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how residents frame the question of waste that has accumulated since the 1940s and has 
been left mostly untouched since it closed.  Auyero and Swistun highlight the fact that 
people are not necessarily thinking about the smaller-scale accidents and miscalculations 
in the petrochemical compound that may still expose them to daily hazards.  There is a 
general belief that “true” harm would be something of the magnitude of an explosion or 
major leak.  Metal Huasi is no longer operating, and so the potential for disaster is not 
even a possibility in residents‟ framing of the issue of contamination and risk, but the 
question of perceptions on which parts of lead waste are most harmful (at various sites) 
despite some evidence to the contrary brings up an analogous point.  Another major 
consideration in this empirical difference between Flammable and Abra Pampa is the 
extent to which criticism and collective mobilization can be directed toward stopping an 
industrial process already underway.  Unlike Flammable, in Abra Pampa that is not a 
possibility. 
A third difference, noted earlier in the introduction, is that collective mobilization 
actually has occurred in Abra Pampa (and mobilization is arguably still underway, 
though not necessarily in a coordinated fashion and as part of what residents call an 
“invisible” struggle).  Though collective mobilization has been sporadic and has notably 
declined since initiation of the problematic remediation plan in 2007, I hesitate to label 
Abra Pampa as a similar “negative case” of a social movement to emerge or its residents 
as quiescent, since for some lead is still very much an issue.  The original intention of this 
research was to explore whether the case of Abra Pampa was analogous to that of 
Flammable regarding the relationship between knowledge and action, but due to the 
challenges present in short-term research and my allegiances to some of the protagonists 
of an “invisible struggle” against contamination (presented in Chapter Six), I hesitate to 
make the same link between toxic uncertainty, submission, and collective inaction here. 
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Another application of Auyero and Swistun‟s case study of Flammable can be 
found in sociologist Lorenzo Natali‟s analysis of “green criminology” in a similarly 
highly polluted community in Huelva, Spain.  In this study, Natali is skeptical of the 
extent to which communities facing environmental contamination will (or are able to) 
frame actionable grievances against the State.  Natali‟s ethnography parts from a 
definition of “environmental crime” that fits under “those dimensions of damage, 
injustice and social harm often neglected by criminal law and by the criminal justice 
system,”41 despite empirical evidence of said damage, injustice, or harm that could be 
used as the basis of a collective understanding of harm in communities facing 
environmental contamination.  Natali notes that part of the reason why “environmental 
crime” is such an elusive frame, particularly for the basis of rights consciousness and 
mobilization in contaminated communities, is that government and business elites often 
employ “greenwashing”: “a communication strategy often used by corporations to render 
an activity that is inevitably dangerous for both environment and people more 
acceptable.”42  In Huelva, as in Flammable and Abra Pampa, “greenwashing” is linked to 
profitable industrial and extractive activity, respectively, in which emphasis on the 
benefits the State is said to derive from said activity downplays its negative 
environmental consequences in affected communities. 
In addition to the interventions and “counterframes” from those who seek to 
“greenwash” contamination, Natali notes that Huelva residents‟ own discourse on 
contamination reveals widespread ambivalence and disagreement – or “toxic uncertainty” 
-- that may also preclude a popular notion of environmental injustice in the community.  
                                                 
41 Lorenzo Natali, “The big grey elephants in the backyard of Huelva, Spain,” in Global Environmental 
Harm: Criminological Experiences.  Ed. Rob White.  (Devon, UK: Willan Publishing, 2010), 195. 
42 Natali, 200. 
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Natali‟s analysis of the normalization of contamination in Huelva is similar to (and draws 
upon) Auyero and Swistun‟s analysis of Flammable, but his specific discussion of justice 
centers on instances of personal injustices that residents note.  Natali posits that while 
these instances do not constitute a collective “metaphysical or transcendental concept of 
justice capable of generating consensus as to what is right and what is wrong” vis-à-vis 
causes and agents responsible for contamination,
43
 differing forms of environmental 
victimization might nonetheless eventually build a more collective claim of injustice.   
Natali‟s analysis of Huelva is conceptually and theoretically informative to the 
case study of Abra Pampa not only for his emphasis of individualized over collective 
frames of injustice (which is also seen in Abra Pampa), but also for his application of the 
idea of “greenwashing” and how uncertainty and confusion “will favour those who have 
the power to define the different objects of contention.”44  A major difference, however, 
like the case of Flammable, is the extent to which a grievance is defined as targeted 
against a specific actor.  In Huelva, Natali notes the impossibility of establishing 
“responsibilities in cause-effect terms”45 – due at least partially to the fact that the sources 
of contamination are multiple and more easily passed off as “someone else‟s 
responsibility.” 
Fundamentally, the present case study of Abra Pampa adds to a growing body of 
literature on toxic uncertainty – such as that of Auyero and Swistun‟s analysis of 
Flammable and Natali‟s analysis of Huelva – by revealing the processes by which 
residents of contaminated communities make sense of multiple discourses on industrial 
pollution, and how these discourses often reflect structural inequalities and biases that 
                                                 
43 Natali, 205. 
44 Natali, 202. 
45 Natali, 199. 
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favor State institutions.  Where it differs, however, is in naming the extent to which 
uncertainty does or does not relate to collective mobilization, and on how residents frame 
grievances when they know who or what is “responsible” for their suffering.  While the 
last chapter and the conclusion will take up the issue of resistance and criticism as it 
exists in Abra Pampa, the majority of this case study instead focuses on how lead has – 
and has not – been understood as an “issue”. 
A reviewer of an early draft of this case study told me that, although it provided a 
good overview of lead contamination in Abra Pampa, it was not clear from what I had 
written whether Abra Pampa residents currently consider lead to be a “problem”.  Indeed, 
the case of Abra Pampa complicates the questions put forth in literature on power and 
toxic uncertainty because lead contamination now appears simultaneously as an issue and 
a “nonissue”, given the fact that a minority of residents are still publicly vocal in their 
criticism of government inaction but some of them note an overall “marked indifference” 
among their neighbors, as one of them put it, now that remediation is ostensibly under 
way.  The “issueness” of lead contamination in Abra Pampa appears to wax and wane in 
accordance with the interventions of outside actors and the State, and shared 
understandings of the imminence of the threat that lead contamination poses also seem to 
be defined according to how physically evident the contamination is (i.e., smoke 
emanating from Metal Huasi, the existence of a large pile of lead in the town center).  
Thus, the interaction of State frames that attempt to downplay or discredit risk associated 
with lead contamination with residents‟ own understandings of contamination is partially 
explained in Lukes, Crenson, Gaventa, Auyero and Swistun, and Natali, but empirical 
differences in the history of the “issueness” of contamination in Abra Pampa raises 
questions on the relationship of dominant institutions and their perceived “legitimacy” at 
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the grassroots level, as well as the relationship of uncertainty to an apparent lack of 
collective mobilization. 
The “snapshots” of understandings of and discourse on contamination that follow 
are meant to show how lead contamination is understood in Abra Pampa from various 
angles: how outsiders manage information and the production of knowledge on the issue, 
how outsider interventions inform residents‟ understandings of the effects of 
contamination, how Abra Pampa residents‟ own discourses on suffering reflect inequality 
in the town, and how and why some residents do consider lead contamination to be a 
serious political issue.  Since it is difficult to say whether uncertainty has, in fact, 
precluded collective mobilization on the issue (due to its periodic resurgence), these 
snapshots instead seek to shed light on how, when, and why lead is defined as an “issue”, 
and under what circumstances it is most commonly-understood as an actionable 
grievance. 
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CHAPTER 3: “DOUBLE DISCOURSE:” STATE RECOGNITION 
AND DENIAL OF CONTAMINATION 
“There is a problem with those results.  We have a problem that is smaller in 
magnitude than what people think,” an official from the Environmental Development 
ministry of the Province of Jujuy told me, after claiming that the results of a 2006 study 
by INQA of the University of Jujuy were “scientifically invalid.”  The INQA study, 
which concluded that 81% of sampled children living within 500 meters of Metal Huasi 
had levels of lead in their blood that exceeded 5 µg/dL, has become a major point of 
contention in discourse on the extent and gravity of contamination in Abra Pampa.  
Immediately in the wake of its publication, it served as a rallying point for concerned 
Abra Pampa residents, and has since become the focus of a concerted effort to downplay 
its damning results.  The tension over the INQA study serves as a microcosm of State 
discourse on contamination in Abra Pampa: in the wake of recent attention in the local 
and national media, particularly since the remediation contract was signed in 2007, the 
provincial and municipal governments have sent mixed messages on the severity of lead 
contamination, as well as on their responsibility to provide remediation in Abra Pampa. 
Since remediation began, there has been simultaneous recognition and denial of 
the possibility that lead waste in Abra Pampa is a serious cause for concern.  
Additionally, the provincial and municipal governments show a simultaneous reliance 
upon and rejection of scientific material to diagnose the degree of lead contamination in 
the town and design “next steps” in the remediation process.  These confusing messages, 
laid over an already uncertain attitude toward lead contamination stemming from Metal 
Huasi activities in Abra Pampa, make rhetorical promises that a solution is coming, but at 
the same time deny that the problem exists in the first place.  This chapter argues that 
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mixed messages from branches of the government concerned with development and 
health policy, and various agencies‟ attempted monopoly on “legitimate” information on 
lead contamination in Abra Pampa, exhibit elements of Lukes, Gaventa, and Crenson‟s 
conceptualizations of power and “issueness”. 
Before proceeding to outline how State management of information is 
manipulated and managed to downplay risks and attempts to keep lead from becoming an 
“issue”, it should be clarified which branches of the State have most problematically done 
so.  Various branches of the government at all levels – federal, provincial, and municipal 
– have intervened on the question of Abra Pampa, and not all with the same exhibition of 
power and agenda-setting that contradicts residents‟ beliefs on the levels of risks they 
face.  Curiously, the 1986 and 2004 studies were conducted by health professionals 
working in the Ministry of Health and the “Toxicology Service” of the province of Jujuy 
--- some of the very agencies that today actively downplay the magnitude of the problems 
associated with lead waste in Abra Pampa.  Even the INQA group‟s 2006 study was 
technically conducted by a State institution – being a branch of a public university in 
Jujuy – and in cooperation with former mayor Hernán Zerpa in Abra Pampa, who is 
widely-credited to have been much more critical of contamination in the town than 
current mayor Ariel Machaca, who took office in 2008. 
Additionally, the federal and provincial Ombudsmen have intervened on the 
question of lead contamination in Abra Pampa, collecting medical and scientific 
documentation on the effects of contamination, issuing resolutions to urge cleanup and 
treatment of individuals believed to be affected by lead poisoning, and sending requests 
for information from federal and provincial-level officials charged with environmental 
remediation in the town.  Although many of these requests and resolutions have gone 
unanswered, as everything now “depends on the municipality to enact them”, as one 
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representative from the Ombudsman office of Jujuy told me, they represent important 
landmarks in official recognition of the gravity of the problem of lead contamination in 
Jujuy.   
Part of the confusion on the extent to which contamination exists in Abra Pampa 
stems from the fact that the effects of lead contamination are notoriously difficult to 
measure, and power elites in the lead industry tend to capitalize on this fact to discredit 
public concern over uses of the metal.  Oftentimes, as Gerald Markowitz and David 
Rosner note in their criticism of the uses of science to deny industrial pollution, it is 
“difficult to show to the satisfaction of government regulators a direct correlation 
between particular chemicals…and the specific illnesses in clusters of people in 
particular communities.”46  They argue that “conservative analysts have used 
epidemiological studies to raise doubts about environmentalists‟ and community 
residents‟ fear of industrial pollution” and “rely on a view of science, and of 
epidemiology in particular, that is overwhelmingly reductionist.  It sees the world in 
mechanistic terms that cannot account for the complexity of interactions and social 
relationships that determine outcomes in complex systems.”47 
A particularly slippery aspect of measuring lead contamination, which State 
officials in the province of Jujuy have capitalized upon to discredit some independent 
investigation on the issue of lead contamination in Abra Pampa, concerns the element‟s 
“bioavailability”, or the ability of lead to enter “various receiving compartments of the 
body through inhalation and ingestion, and the subsequent absorption of some fraction of 
                                                 
46 Gerald Markowitz and David Rosner, Deceit and Denial: The Deadly Politics of Industrial Pollution.  
(Berkeley: The University of California Press, 2002),  290. 
47 Markowitz and Rosner, 292. 
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the lead intake.”48  In Abra Pampa, discussions on the bioavailability of lead have mostly 
centered around the somewhat enigmatic humos blancos particles.  One of the leading 
arguments from health advocates who have worked in Abra Pampa cite the fact that 
humos blancos are small, very easily transported, and perhaps difficult to avoid in Abra 
Pampa due to their ability to travel undetectably on wind and in rain runoff.  Particles  
have been deposited in soils where children play, on walls and doors that people touch, 
and in the air people in Abra Pampa breathe, no matter their distance from deposits of 
heavy metal waste.   
When confronted with such enigmatic sources of lead contamination, Paul 
Mushak notes, a number of different studies on lead contamination and its sources could 
produce completely different results, due to factors such as age group, how long residents 
have lived in presumably contaminated communities, and the extent to which an 
education campaign took place before blood-lead samples were taken, which could 
temporarily reduce average blood-lead levels in samples if precautionary measures had 
been taken.  In other words, “little standardization of study designs in these lead-exposed 
communities has been done.  Different researchers studying the same community can 
arrive at quite different results, depending on the nature of the study design.”49 
Officials in the provincial government of Jujuy have capitalized on this lack of 
standardization to conduct studies that produce completely different results from those 
which present evidence that criticizes its inaction on lead contamination.  This comes 
through most clearly in the case of Abra pampa in tensions between the INQA group and 
the Ministry of Health, which has a “Bioethics Committee” that approves the 
                                                 
48 Mushak, Paul.  “Uses and Limits of Empirical Data in Measuring and Modeling Human Lead 
Exposure.”  Environmental Health Perspectives 106, no. 6 (1998): 1467-1484. P. 1468 
 
49 Mushak, 1472. 
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methodology of health studies carried out in Jujuy as a condition of their ability to be 
published.  INQA is a group of engineers and doctors with the public National University 
of Jujuy, located in the provincial capital San Salvador de Jujuy, who in recent years have 
attempted to study the environmental and health impact of mining and other extractive 
industry activities in Abra Pampa and other places in the province.  Although INQA takes 
care to complete all steps to approve their projects through the Bioethics Committee of 
the Ministry of Health, one member of the group confided in an interview that it is “no 
secret” that the Ministry has attempted to block publication of several of their studies: 
“We waited over one year for approval from the Ministry of Health.  We submitted our 
protocol, our methodology, our consent forms, everything to the Bioethics Committee, 
and we would wait months until it gave us a response,” she said.   
INQA did eventually earn approval from the Ministry of Health to publish its 
findings, but in an interview with said Ministry in January of 2010, the head of the 
Bioethics Committee denied ever having granted approval of the methodology of their 
study, which garnered much local and national media attention for its claims that 81% of 
sampled children in Abra Pampa had unacceptably high levels of lead in their blood.  The 
INQA group is currently designing a study on the health effects of a lead smelter that is 
currently in operation in nearby Palpalá, and has been awaiting a response and approval 
from the Bioethics Committee to begin the project for over two years, according to INQA 
members. 
In 2007, the same year in which the INQA group‟s study on blood-lead levels in 
children in Abra Pampa was published, the Ministry of Health of the province of Jujuy 
began its own health study to “georeference” cases of lead poisoning in Abra Pampa.  
Part of the rationale behind said study, according to Dr. Marcelo Bellone of the Ministry 
of Health, is that “lead can be present anywhere,” including in rocks in the surrounding 
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environment.  Furthermore, he noted in an interview with the University of Texas Human 
Rights Clinic, preliminary results showed “no correlation” between blood-lead levels and 
distance from homes and the Metal Huasi smelter.   
Although this study has yet to be published and publicly disseminated, Carlos 
Ripoll, a public health director of the province of Jujuy, handed a copy of the results to 
me in an interview in which he and other health officials with the Ministry widely 
discredited the work of INQA, and subsequently my own work, for having cited the 
group‟s study of 2006.  Ironically, the study uses some of the same language of the INQA 
study word-for-word, yet reaches completely opposite conclusions.  A side-by-side 
reading of the two studies leads one to the conclusion that the Ministry of Health‟s study 
is a “counterstudy” of sorts, which attempts to “scientifically” disprove previous 
independent results on the extent of lead contamination that might directly stem from 
Metal Huasi and the waste that was left exposed to the air for decades.   
The Ministry of Health‟s georeference study, which emphasizes the fact that it is 
based on the WHO‟s standard of 10 µg/dL as an “acceptable” maximum level of lead in 
the blood (as opposed to 5, which is increasingly recognized in the medical community 
and was the standard cited in the INQA report), builds from an apparent motivation to 
discredit the INQA results of 2007. On the INQA report, it notes in its preliminary 
summary of results from 2007 that “from the total of analyzed samples (234), 28% had 
values higher than 10µg/dL, the minimum accepted by the WHO,”50  and implicit 
qualification of the widely-cited 81% that had been published in the INQA report.  It goes 
on to note that results of tests on children who took part in the INQA study in 2006 were 
supposedly never turned in to the hospital of Abra Pampa or to the Ministry of Health of 
                                                 
50 “Contaminación por plomo en el pueblo de Abra Pampa, Departamento Cochinoca Provincia de Jujuy,” 
Ministerio de Salud de la Provincia de Jujuy, 2007. 
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the province (though INQA members did deliver them to families of sampled children), 
and there is therefore “no evidence that would indicate the presence and/or possibility of 
children with acute lead or chronic lead poisoning in Abra Pampa.”51  In results of the 
study that were apparently finalized in 2009, the Ministry goes on to conclude that 
behavior typical of children – such as crawling, eating dirt, and putting objects in their 
mouth – do not place them at higher risk of exposure to bioavailable lead particles, a 
direct contradiction of a major conclusion and subsequent educational campaign of the 
INQA group. 
Despite this near blanket denial of health consequences of lead smelting activity 
in Abra Pampa, discourse on remediation at times, paradoxically, acknowledges health 
and environmental concerns.  News articles often quote officials from the very offices 
that downplay the results reached in independent studies on lead contamination as saying 
that the health and environmental situation in Abra Pampa is urgent, playing up its 
“proactive” role in cleaning up the lead despite the fact that waste was left by a private 
company, and therefore not in the State‟s purview to remedy.  The promise of 
remediation, despite the problematic ways in which it has been carried out and the fact 
that it is nowhere near complete, reads as a hopeful, if empty, rhetorical solution. 
The role remediation might play in justifying the State‟s own authority over the 
issue of lead contamination becomes a bit more apparent when viewed through criticism 
that Argentine semiotics scholar Mirta Antonelli has applied to the mining industry in 
Argentina.  The mining industry, Antonelli argues, operates on a basis of a manipulative 
“good neighbor politics”, in which community improvement projects, investment in 
environmental remediation, and a general promotion of sustainable development 
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practices create a “pact of peaceful „association‟ between mining companies and the 
jurisdictional State.”52   
Part of this display of “good neighbor politics,” Antonelli continues, comes 
through in mining companies‟ co-optation of principles of deliberative democracy and a 
“culture of/for peace”, which seeks to displace community discontent with mining 
activity.  Antonelli identifies two “discursive models”: a “deliberative” model, which 
“aims for consensus regarding the extractive model”, and “dialogue” model, which is 
used to “reach agreements, negotiations, etc., which erode obstacles to mining expansion 
in threatened or affected communities.”53  In this sense, projects like remediation and 
affirmations of environmental and/or corporate responsibility, under ostensible 
“engagement” with the community, are meant to facilitate ultimate acceptance of mining 
projects, in her view.  In practice, however, Antonelli notes that mining companies 
“construct and consolidate a scientific discourse…that invokes „expert knowledge‟ 
inaccessible to the common people”54 in order to justify their own policies.   
While Antonelli‟s work is empirically about a different stage in the mining 
process – that of granting concessions – and Abra Pampa‟s issues with lead 
contamination are related to problematic environmental regulations after mining activity 
has ceased, it is important to note that in Abra Pampa, discourse on remediation fulfills a 
similar role as the “dialogue model” outlined above.  The contracting of CESEL, a huge 
Peruvian mining consulting firm which features “before and after” pictures of degraded 
areas they have “remade” in other Latin American countries, and the signing of the 
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remediation loan contract as part of the IDB‟s “sustainable mining” project, send the 
message that mining‟s wrongs can and will eventually be corrected.  Skeptical Abra 
Pampa residents wonder if the remediation process is just a façade for hiding or excusing 
environmentally harmful practices in the mining sector. 
Many suspect that mining interests are behind the remediation plan as it is 
currently being implemented, particularly since waste materials are being held at nearby 
Minera Aguilar, which is owned by Glencore International A.G., a Swiss mining 
company that proclaims itself “a major participant in the global flow of natural 
resources” on its company Web site.  Additionally, Abra Pampa is being touted as a stop 
in a forthcoming “Mining Circuit” in Jujuy, meant to develop rural tourism in many of 
the communities where mining activity has taken place.  This “ecotourism” circuit 
mentions Abra Pampa as an attraction near Mina Aguilar, which currently holds and 
manages waste that has been taken out of Abra Pampa to date.
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  Assuming that the tour 
would officially begin to operate after remediation takes place, here it would play a 
decidedly important factor in enhancing the mining industry‟s image to be sold to 
tourists. 
When representatives of CESEL arrived in Abra Pampa in February of 2010, they 
held a sparsely-attended “town hall meeting” of sorts with residents of Abra Pampa 
(although many of them were not aware that it was going to happen) and representatives 
of GEAMIN to introduce themselves and the work they would be doing. According to 
one resident who attended, “they gave us a brochure telling us about what they do.  It had 
pictures of the ugliest mine on Earth, and next to it a picture of how they cleaned it up.  It 
suddenly had trees, grass…but you know what?  It looked painted!” CESEL has set up a 
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Web site, http://www.abrapamparemedia.com, that has links for information on the 
progress of scientific studies carried out in Abra Pampa, a “transparency” section in 
which citizens can participate in a forum, and suggests that the firm‟s activities will lead 
to two imminent “phases” of remediation: to remove waste in the Barrio 12 de Octubre 
and to determine levels of contamination for “all areas” impacted by Metal Huasi.56  
From February until May of 2011, however, this Web site did not function. 
While ostensibly this information does sound promising and transparent, the 
majority of the information that was on the site is phrased in such a way that only 
scientists with highly specialized training are likely to understand.  There is no specific 
information on exactly when or how said remediation is to take place, and it is unclear 
how information gleaned from CESEL‟s studies in Abra Pampa will be used toward 
environmental remediation.  In an interview in July of 2010, a spokesman from the office 
of Abra Pampa mayor Ariel Machaca affirmed that study results would be available 
sometime in September of 2010, but that “complete remediation will take place, 
especially in the Barrio 12 de Octubre, before the end of the year.”  As of March 2011, no 
actions toward remediation – nor dissemination of the results of CESEL‟s studies – had 
yet taken place. 
In mid-2010, residents awaited the return of CESEL scientists to reveal the results 
of studies they had carried out in the town earlier that year.  A special town hall meeting 
was to be held on July 15, in which these scientists were to share their results with the 
public, and the federal and provincial mining secretariats would then outline “next steps” 
in the remediation process.  When I arrived in Abra Pampa in early June of 2010, one of 
my informants, among the most consistently vocal on the issue of lead in the town, 
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immediately told me, “July 15 – write that down.  It‟s going to be a very important day.  
They‟re going to come and tell us what they know about the lead.”  July 15 eventually 
came and went with no news from the firm, and as of April of 2011, it has still not shared 
any published results with the community. An anonymous reader‟s comment in the 
“feedback” section of a Web article on CESEL‟s first visit to Abra Pampa in February of 
2010 summarizes the current sentiment in Abra Pampa regarding remediation.  After a 
sentence affirming that “the opinion of residents at the meeting was optimistic and 
confident that the [remediation] tasks would be realized rapidly, seriously, and safely, 
and that they would give full support so that these tasks could be carried out,” a single, 
unpunctuated word in the comment section at the bottom of the Web page reads 
“cuando”: “when”.57  This question has yet to be answered. 
Through simultaneous acknowledgment and denial and use of inaccessible 
scientific rhetoric that amounts to little more than “neighborly” propaganda, public 
officials from dominant governmental institutions have both diverted and confused 
attention on lead contamination on Abra Pampa.   Here, the provincial government of 
Jujuy, which has close ties to the lucrative mining industry, legitimizes its own authority 
through the monopolization of intransparent scientific information that seeks to discredit 
independent investigation, hinting at Gaventa, Lukes, and Crenson‟s theories say on 
legitimization and subtle exercise of power.  Through downplaying the extent to which 
lead waste from Metal Huasi may be a direct cause of lead contamination in Abra Pampa 
residents, placing “legitimate” knowledge in its own hands, and heralding a dubious 
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cleanup plan as a solution to problems it itself has denied, the provincial government has 
attempted to divert “issueness” of the problem of lead contamination. 
By holding a rhetorical monopoly on “scientifically valid” information and 
publicly discrediting reports that present unfavorable evidence of human suffering at the 
hands of mining-related activity, the federal provincial mining authorities and Ministry of 
Health of the province of Jujuy attempt to assert their own legitimacy.  This exertion of 
power, through the control of knowledge, reflects Lukes‟ (and Gaventa‟s interpretation of 
Lukes) “third dimension” of power, in which attempts to avert opposition and 
maintaining unequal power imbalances between mining interests and communities which 
are adversely affected by mining activity.  The following chapters will explore how Abra 
Pampa residents engage with this and other outsider-produced “knowledge”, describing 
the extent to which uncertainty and “issueness” regarding lead arise. 
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CHAPTER 4: OUTSIDER INTERVENTIONS AND RISK 
PERCEPTIONS 
 
“What we have is sacred and what we suffer today is your people‟s fault…Please, 
no more multinationals in our territory!!!”58  These concluding sentences to a note I 
received explaining the reason that a group did not want to give an interview with me in 
June of 2010 perhaps best encapsulates the symbolic violence that has been committed 
against Abra Pampa residents by outsiders who come to study lead contamination.  In the 
past decade, dozens of people and organizations have come to Abra Pampa to measure 
contamination of the environment and residents‟ health: journalists, lawyers, engineers, 
activists, doctors, government officials, mining company representatives, and law and 
graduate students from the University of Texas.  While these groups have come with a 
variety of motives and their publications have received mixed appraisals from Abra 
Pampa residents, one thing is clear: these interventions, which often provide some kind of 
“expert” evaluation of contamination in Abra Pampa, contribute to “toxic uncertainty” 
there by providing differing, and contested, degrees of recognition or denial of problems 
associated with lead.  Additionally, little concrete action has been taken toward 
improving environmental and health conditions in Abra Pampa as the result of these 
studies, contributing to a deep distrust of outsiders that many residents share. 
Residents‟ interactions with outsider and “expert” evaluation of lead 
contamination have both shaped and precluded the degree to which Metal Huasi waste is 
defined as a problem in the town.  Various studies and political interventions in the town 
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seek to “objectify” the question of lead contamination, but in so doing, they create 
multiple discourses that assert multiple conclusions on contamination, which often fall 
along political lines.  Outsider interventions have both correlated with and, in other 
instances, perhaps precluded the formation of common definitions of lead contamination 
as a serious problem.  This chapter seeks to outline what Auyero and Swistun call the 
“labor of confusion,” which is “performed by a series of interconnected actors”, as it 
relates to how Abra Pampa residents understand actual risk that Metal Huasi waste poses 
vis-à-vis outsiders‟ evaluations and actions. 
This chapter will discuss three specific “outsider” interventions on the question of 
lead: first, it will discuss the effects of health studies and of actions that have been taken 
(or ignored) toward environmental remediation.  Finally, on a personal note, I will briefly 
discuss the impact of the interventions of University of Texas at Austin students, both the 
Human Rights Clinic and my own as an independent researcher.  Evidence from 
interviews conducted with many residents suggests that interventions in the form of 
health studies have both aided and correlated with organized public protest in Abra 
Pampa, but at the same time are actively discredited by residents who do not consider 
lead contamination to be a problem.  Other interventions, namely toward remediation, 
have been dubbed “tricky” (“truco”) for their perceived links to profit in the mining 
industry, meant to minimize the alarm that has sprung up in the past regarding lead waste 
in the town (hence the reaction I received in the note quoted above).  Whatever the 
intentions of outsiders, there is a common preoccupation among Abra Pampa residents: 
conflicting study results and focuses lead to conflicting understandings of the extent and 
gravity of exposure to lead waste, which has contributed to a general feeling of despair 
that “outsiders” will actually solve the environmental and public health problems linked 
to lead contamination. 
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HEALTH STUDIES 
As has been mentioned in the first chapter of this case study, health studies in 
Abra Pampa have at least correlated with peak moments of heightened public concern 
over lead in the town.  The 1986 health study, the first published government 
acknowledgment of lead contamination in children in Abra Pampa, was conducted at a 
time in which residents were rallying around air pollution stemming from Metal Huasi.  
The provincial government‟s 2004 study and the INQA group‟s 2006 study brought 
heightened local and national attention to the problems associated with Metal Huasi even 
twenty years after it closed, correlating with collective mobilization around the pile of 
lead waste in the center of the town.  In a way, then, quantifying and objectifying the 
amount of lead in children‟s blood raised consciousness of the dangers that residents 
faced, providing a specific measure of how pollution and waste affect residents. 
Aside from the three studies mentioned above, the law office of Riad Quintar, 
who is a provincial-level political representative based in San Salvador de Jujuy,  played 
an instrumental role in transforming, as one resident put it, “what we always suspected 
into reality.”  Beginning in the year 2003, Riad Quintar‟s office hired an outside group of 
doctors to take blood from several residents to determine the amount of lead they had in 
their blood.  Eventually, dozens of families joined three separate suits against the 
municipality for health damages in residents whose blood-lead levels measured above 10 
µg/dL.
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  A total of around 400 Abra Pampa residents are now part of the Quintar suit. 
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province should be held responsible for lead contamination. 
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Nearly all of the people who I interviewed who consistently framed lead as a 
problem in Abra Pampa were parties to the Quintar suit, and most cited Quintar‟s health 
study as that which gave them a clearer understanding of the problems that lead poses: 
 
“Before, I always knew I was sick.  My head would hurt, my body would 
hurt…then I got my [blood test] results back, and I knew it must be from lead.” 
 
“My results show less than 10 [µg/dL], so for me it‟s not that bad.  My husband 
has twice that much, so I worry for him.” 
 
“I never thought about lead until about 2003, 2005, whenever I first gave blood 
with Quintar.  It turns out we‟re all contaminated, and that makes life here hard, 
you know?” 
 
For many residents, particularly those involved in the Quintar case, lead 
contamination is understood as something quantifiable that they possess in their bodies.  
Many of them tap the inside of their forearm when they talk about lead and its health 
effects, a gesture that suggests they have given blood for at least one of various health 
studies that have been conducted in Abra Pampa.  Results showing a high level of lead in 
the blood, particularly in tests performed after Metal Huasi stopped operating, seem to 
have played an instrumental role in redefining Metal Huasi waste, not just past pollution 
that emptied into the air, as a major health threat.  For example, Fernando, the longtime 
Abra Pampa resident quoted extensively in Chapter One, says that he had “almost 
forgotten” the concerns that he and some neighbors had shared about Metal Huasi several 
years after it closed.  “Then Quintar came, and I thought we should get tested,” he says of 
his family.  He learned that one of his sons, who was still quite young when Metal Huasi 
closed, had a blood-lead level of close to 50 µg/dL, five times that deemed “acceptable” 
and the point at which considerable cognitive and physical disabilities are evident.  “Then 
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I knew why [my son] wasn‟t well.  We all had really high levels of lead, and then people 
started talking about lead and Metal Huasi again.”  
One unintended consequence of the score of health studies that have been 
conducted in Abra Pampa in recent years, however, is that some consider their results to 
be the most legitimate form of “evidence” of their suffering.  When test results contradict 
themselves or are not presented, residents question how lead actually affects them.  Some 
residents who have given multiple blood samples report getting different results and do 
not know which is the most accurate, or why.  One resident‟s summary of the studies in 
which he had taken place, and which is similar to many other residents who cited 
confusion, rather than certainty, about their blood-lead levels went as follows: “I gave 
three samples: in one, I had [20 µg/dL].  In another, 17.  And in the third…I don‟t know.  
I‟m contaminated, but I feel fine, so I just don‟t think about it.” 
The Health Ministry of Jujuy‟s most recent attempt to “georeference” the highest 
blood-lead levels in the town, presumably to help determine “priority” areas for targeted 
action during environmental remediation, is often cited as one that has provoked 
consternation and confusion among its participants.  The results of this study have not yet 
been made public, and none of the interviewed residents who took part reported having 
learned their results. I received a copy of this study‟s preliminary results as the result of a 
January 2010 meeting with the Ministry, and it has concluded that a “probable” 10 
percent of the 1,000 sampled residents is contaminated.
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 Officials working both within 
the Ministry and at the hospital in Abra Pampa claim that results from this study have 
been available at the hospital for years – though nobody who was interviewed and had 
                                                 
60 Ministerio de Salud de la Provincia de Jujuy, Untitled Study, 9 December, 2009.  These figures are 
much lower than those revealed in previous health studies in Abra Pampa, which maintain that 80 percent 
of the town‟s children have blood –lead levels exceeding those deemed “normal” or “acceptable”. 
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taken place in this study was ever made aware of that fact.  Disturbingly, one employee at 
the Abra Pampa hospital noted that there are “dozens” of files, which this individual was 
once told were the results of blood tests taken for the georeference study, have never been 
opened.  “How can the government be sure that its results are accurate if nobody has seen 
them?” this employee asked. 
At the same time that scores of residents cite a better “understanding” of their 
health predicaments once they knew how much lead was in their blood, and how those 
specific quantities are likely to affect one‟s health, other residents are dubious on these 
tests‟ accuracy.  They exhibit what Auyero and Swistun call “denial”, a manifestation of 
toxic uncertainty in which “residents actually challenge existing data showing that 
environmental pollution has reached toxic levels or when they use their own healthy 
bodies to deny serious contamination.”61  Though residents know, from conclusions to 
health studies, from media coverage, and from what lawyers have told them, what the 
effects of lead contamination are, and which blood-lead levels are considered harmful, 
some note that there are groups of Abra Pampa residents who would seem most 
vulnerable to lead contamination but do not appear to show any signs of lead poisoning. 
One such group are ex-employees of Metal Huasi, who are often used as “points 
of reference” when other residents describe their own doubts about the adverse effects of 
exposure to lead:  “You see 80-year-old men who breathed that smoke and worked right 
next to the pile for years, and they ride their bicycles around town as if it were nothing 
(“como si nada.”).”  “You hear about people who lived next to the pile for years, and 
they say they‟re healthy.” “He grew flowers next to the mountain [of lead].  How do you 
explain that?”   
                                                 
61 Auyero and Swistun, 91. 
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The latter question was posed regarding a 62-year-old man who lived on the 
grounds of Metal Huasi for over 25 years after having worked there most of his life, as 
both groundskeeper and as the owner of a small café that operated next to where the pile 
of lead waste once stood.  This man, who many refer to as the most vocal “contracara” – 
“flipside” – to complaints related to contamination, maintains that he and his three 
children, now adults, are completely healthy, and that stories about the health effects of 
lead contamination are lies: 
 
“Mental atrophy?  That‟s a lie.  My children grew up on the [Metal Huasi] site 
with me and my wife.  We lived there permanently.  Now my daughter is an 
accountant and my sons are teachers…I‟m not sick.  I went to the doctor in [San 
Salvador de] Jujuy.  My only problem is with my knee.  People are just agitators.” 
Another former Metal Huasi worker, who now runs a small business three blocks 
away from the Metal Huasi site, noted that journalists and researchers from outside of 
Abra Pampa often approach him, assuming that he has high levels of lead in his blood:  
 
“I‟ve never even had an analysis done,” he said.  “I feel fine.  Do they want me to 
say I‟m sick?  You know, this whole thing with Metal Huasi is just an industry 
here.  People conduct studies and start to talk about taking [waste] away to make 
money.  I‟m not interested in that.” 
While discourse on lead contamination often focuses on the imminent dangers 
people believe that children in particular face, in a few instances residents have pointed 
out contradictory moments in which children do not appear to be affected – residents 
have mentioned championship-winning basketball teams comprised of Abra Pampa 
students, children who won a recent math competition against other schools in the area, 
and the fact that, like the children of the man quoted above, many go on to professions 
which presumably they would not be able to do if they had been severely affected by lead 
poisoning.  As with Metal Huasi workers, these groups of seemingly unaffected children 
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are occasionally referred to as evidence that contradicts medical literature on the health 
effects of lead contamination. 
 
REMEDIATION 
An earlier quote from an Abra Pampa resident, in her reaction to content on the 
CESEL Web site devoted to remediation in Abra Pampa, noted that “they talk a lot 
without saying anything.”  In this case, she was specifically referring to scientists from 
CESEL who provided much more information on highly specialized methodologies and 
actions that would one day be taken, rather than concrete information on steps that had be 
taken toward remediation to date.  However, this sentiment can be extrapolated and 
applied to many other conversations on remediation and lead contamination in Abra 
Pampa, with the ubiquitous “they” being government and health officials, lawyers, and 
journalists who have intervened on the issue while only offering imminent, incomplete, 
or flat denial of solutions to the problem of contamination.  This section highlights some 
of the dominant narratives on environmental lead contamination in Abra Pampa today, 
with special emphasis on the ways in which remediation plays in to discourse on the 
extent and gravity of lead contamination in the town. 
The promise of remediation may have quelled collective mobilization for the time 
being, particularly since the strikingly visual reminder of lead contamination in the town 
has been removed the 15,000-ton cerro in the town center).  However, there is still a 
general belief – albeit to different degrees – that lead poses some level of threat to 
residents‟ health.  It is just not clear how great the actual risk might be, and remediation 
actions and discourse have exacerbated this confusion.  Two major strands of discourse 
on remediation as it has been carried out so far reflect this confusion, as well as a deep 
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distrust in the government.  One is that the partial and hasty initiation of remediation – 
removing the pile of lead at the Metal Huasi site without taking necessary environmental 
safety precautions – has exacerbated existing problems associated with contamination.  
Another is that actions toward remediation have confused which deposits and specific 
parts of lead waste are most dangerous, and the degree to which lead waste actually poses 
a threat to residents. 
Rumor and distrust 
Faced with a lack of concrete information on the progress or motives behind 
remediation that has been carried out so far, a slew of rumors has cropped up among 
Abra Pampa residents to explain the provincial government‟s potential motives behind 
hurriedly taking away parts of the Metal Huasi waste, without waiting for disbursement 
of IDB funds or first consulting with the community.  Most of these rumors center on a 
belief that the province of Jujuy has only initiated “remediation” to the extent that 
someone is able to profit from it.  This belief stems from the fact that the pile of lead in 
the town center and waste at the Arroyo Tabladitas site was removed under the auspices 
of the semi-private “Chamber of Mining” (Cámara Minera) of Jujuy, which is comprised 
of representatives of mining companies that operate in the province, and that Minera 
Aguilar, a mining company, is in charge of storing this waste underground in a nearby 
mine.  Many residents believe that the Chamber of Mining only took materials that could 
be refined again. One lifelong resident remarked of the sudden removal of the pile in the 
town center, “Cuando la limosna es grande, hasta el santo desconfía.” (“When the 
charity is great, even a saint will not trust it.”) “Hay plata en humo,” (“There is 
silver/money in smoke.”) another joked, playing with the double meaning of “plata” in 
Argentinean Spanish to mean both “silver” (which was also processed at Metal Huasi) 
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and “money,” referring to humos blancos in the waste that he believed was taken away 
for Minera Aguilar‟s profit. 
 Residents also speculate that waste has only been removed so far to make room 
for new development projects such as a new bus station or plaza in the area where Metal 
Huasi once operated.  “They want to forget the bad and change it into something good,” 
one woman remarked.  “But who would want to sit in that plaza?  The Plaza Re 
Contaminada!” (“Really Contaminated Plaza!”).  A resident of the Barrio 12 de Octubre 
said, “It can‟t be that priorities are with transportation over soccer…Or is it that lead in 
the Barrio 12 de Octubre isn‟t as bad as lead at the [Metal Huasi site]?”, referring to the 
fact that, unlike in the town center, where a new bus station is rumored to be built, waste 
in his neighborhood has not only remained virtually untouched by remediation efforts to 
date, but also doubles as a soccer field.    
Other residents – particularly those who lived near the Metal Huasi site when the 
pile of lead was removed starting in late 2008 – maintain that this may have exacerbated 
problems associated with lead, noting the problematic ways in which the pile of lead was 
removed from the town center and the fact that remediation plans carry no provision to 
treat residents with high blood-lead levels.  A family that has lived half a block from the 
Metal Huasi site for two generations offered a sort of “before and after” anecdote to 
describe problems they noted with lead contamination.  While they and their children 
have always noted problems in their bones and vision, two symptoms of lead poisoning, 
they say things got worse after the pile of lead so close to their house was removed.  
“Something was released when they took it away so quickly,” the mother of the family 
noted.  “[In 2008 and 2009], the ground would shine at night.  I would put clothes outside 
to dry, and they would turn white by the time they were dry.  Before, we grew everything 
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in our garden, but the humos blancos [from the pile of lead] landed there and destroyed 
everything.  Now that soil is useless.” 
A “marked indifference” 
Some of the dominant narratives on contamination in Abra Pampa since the 
initiation of remediation reflect a perception that the pile of heavy metal waste in the 
town center presented perhaps the most clear and present danger to Abra Pampa 
residents.  “That was the contamination you could see,” noted one middle-aged lifelong 
Abra Pampa resident who grew up three blocks away from the smelter.  “Now that it‟s 
gone, there is a marked indifference toward the issue of lead.”  In addition to being the 
symbol around which Abra Pampa residents rallied during brief periods of collective 
mobilization on the issue of lead contamination, the pile of waste next to the smelter was 
also the topic of the health studies conducted in 1986, 2004, and 2006, as they measured 
the blood-lead levels of children living within varying concentric distances of the smelter.  
When the provincial Chamber of Mining removed the pile of lead from the town center in 
late 2008, many residents note, protest on the existence of the heavy metal waste died 
down as well.  The fact that a large spread of heavy metal slag that is chemically similar 
to that which existed at the smelter site, as well as remnants of humos blancos on the 
Metal Huasi grounds and at the Arroyo Tabladitas, have not garnered a comparable level 
of sustained public concern. 
One interviewed resident, for example, maintains that assertions of the dangers 
present in Metal Huasi waste that has not yet been taken away, including humos blancos, 
are misguided: “Dust [humos blancos] is not lead.  All that is left there is garbage.  It 
doesn‟t contaminate.  That‟s not hurting anybody.”  Another resident maintains that, 
because humos blancos are so difficult to measure and manage due to their size and 
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ability to regenerate on exposed lead, it is “not worth getting worried” about them.  
“They‟re probably all around town, but maybe not enough to make you sick,” he says.  
“It‟s not like before, when there was a small mountain of pure lead.” 
Despite the fact that waste that had been deposited in what is now the Barrio 12 
de Octubre and Arroyo Tabladitas is essentially the same as what was found at the Metal 
Huasi site, there has been a general sense that the waste at the Metal Huasi site was 
somehow the “most dangerous.”  One Barrio 12 de Octubre mother, who has long been 
concerned about the effects of lead on her four children, said that shortly after the pile 
was removed from the town center in 2009, her 8-year-old son brought a piece of the 
metal waste he found near Metal Huasi to school to show his teacher.  He wanted to do a 
science project about the lead waste he had heard so much about at that time:  
 
“She asked him where he found the waste, and when he told her „Metal Huasi,‟ 
she told him to take the lead out immediately because it was poison and was 
going to make his classmates sick.  When he came home that night, he asked me, 
“Mama, if one little piece of lead is so poisonous in the classroom, why is there 
still so much of it on the soccer field?‟ [near their house].  I didn‟t have an 
answer.” 
Additionally, some interviewed residents are skeptical of how officials with the 
federal mining secretariat in 2007 and, three years later, scientists from CESEL, took 
samples of the air to determine how much humos blancos  were contaminating it to 
inform subsequent cleanup.  Some voiced concerns that they weren‟t taking samples 
during the predictably windiest months in Abra Pampa, when humos blancos may have 
been more present, and that stations where air was captured was either upwind or too far 
away from the town to reflect what they believe is their contaminated reality.  While 
methodologies for determining the amounts of lead contamination in the air, soil, and 
water were made “transparent” on CESEL‟s “Abra Pampa Remedia” Web site, they were 
given in such highly-specialized mathematical and scientific language that very few lay 
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people visiting the site are likely to understand.  To date, results from studies CESEL 
conducted in February-April of 2010 have only been released to the federal mining 
secretariat.  This, combined with contradictory or nonexistent blood sample results, has 
contributed to a generalized confusion about how much the State‟s “science” represents 
reality.  As one resident put it, “We know we‟re contaminated; we just don‟t know how 
much.”  Another remarked that he had heard from “someone who works in the municipal 
government” that “somebody with CESEL told him that, „according to my experience, 
there is no contamination in Abra Pampa.‟”  Whether or not this statement is true, it 
indicates a level of suspicion and doubt about what CESEL is supposedly quantifying, 
why, and what the results of contamination may have been. 
 
THE UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS 
Since my multiple visits and ongoing research in Abra Pampa have made me a 
recognizable and conspicuous “outsider” in Abra Pampa, I feel it is necessary to evaluate 
my own presence in Abra Pampa, both as a member of the Human Rights Clinic of the 
University of Texas School of Law in 2009 and as an independent researcher who has 
traveled to Abra Pampa to conduct fieldwork for this study.  It is difficult to clearly 
articulate what the impact of these projects has been or will be in Abra Pampa, due to the 
fact that they are relatively recent and few people explicitly addressed them in interviews.  
Additionally, I found early in my ethnographic fieldwork that few Abra Pampa residents 
had seen or even heard about the human rights report before my first solo visit in January 
of 2010, three months after several governmental offices and NGOs had received copies.  
Thus, in this section, I will reflect on people‟s reactions toward me as an independent 
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researcher – but one who is usually identified a co-author of the Human Rights Clinic‟s 
report – as potential indicators of confusion provoked by these interventions. 
First, it should be reiterated here that I was a conspicuous outsider in Abra Pampa 
and in San Salvador de Jujuy, and I believe that my affiliation with the University of 
Texas heavily influenced both who agreed to give interviews and the content of these 
interviews, especially among those who had seen or heard of the Human Rights Clinic‟s 
report prior to speaking with me.  This was clearly evident in the interview with the 
Ministry of Health in January of 2010 that is described in the introduction to this study.  
This was also true of my early ethnographic interviews in Abra Pampa that year, since 
many of my initial contacts were either perhaps unusually willing to speak with me or 
overtly distrustful of me because of my affiliation with the Human Rights Clinic, 
depending on the degree to which they view contamination as a threat. 
Most of the reactions to the Clinic‟s work that I registered were from 
governmental officials or professionals working outside of Abra Pampa who received 
copies of the Human Rights Clinic‟s report – which ranged from active discrediting of the 
report or government officials‟ refusal to give interviews to offers of support from 
activists and human rights defenders to phone calls from Argentine lawyers working on 
similar cases in other cities.  In these cases, I was assumed to be a lawyer or 
environmental contamination “expert”, and people‟s reactions to my presence and to the 
Clinic‟s work likely reflected their own interests in intervening (or failing to intervene) 
on the question of lead in Abra Pampa. 
In Abra Pampa itself, however, I found that my position as a researcher and co-
author of the human rights report occasionally put me in an uncomfortable role as an 
“expert” on lead contamination there.  In more than one interview, when people noted 
having health problems with lead, they would ask me or assume that I knew what specific 
 74 
health problems correlate with specific blood-lead levels.  Others would ask me in which 
years certain studies, demonstrations, and article publications occurred, or assumed that I 
somehow “knew more” about the history of the town as an outside researcher than they 
did as residents.  These assumptions are problematic, and likely indicate popular 
uncertainty that has been provoked or at least exacerbated by past interventions and 
multiple versions of the “truth” on lead contamination. 
While some “outsider” interventions are perceived as having a “positive effect” 
on residents‟ ability to name lead waste as a problem – namely those done in the form of 
taking blood samples to quantify lead poisoning in Abra Pampa – others, namely 
remediation, have left residents skeptical, distrustful, or perhaps more confused on what 
elements of the lead waste that remains in the town are actually harmful.  The fact that 
remediation has been carried out hastily and with very little transparency – or at least 
without providing much substantive information – contributes to this confusion by 
relegating future actions and rationale behind actions taken to date to rumor and hearsay.  
The multiple truths that outsiders have professed about the state and severity of 
contamination in Abra Pampa have  provided moments of clarity as well as doubt among 
residents. 
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CHAPTER 5: CLASS AND DENIAL AND RECOGNITION OF 
SUFFERING 
In the first chapter, it was mentioned that when many people in Abra Pampa talk 
about lead, it is often relegated to background noise, or as a bullet point in a long list of 
more immediate health and social concerns in the town.  Key among these are a 
perceived increase in the use of drugs, alcoholism, teenage pregnancy, teenage suicide, 
lack of potable water in some neighborhoods, sub-par hospital facilities, the presence of 
traffickers of “paco” (unprocessed cocaine), proximity to the town‟s open-air landfill, 
inadequate drainage of wastewater, and widespread unemployment.  Given this context, it 
is perhaps no wonder that lead, an “invisible” contaminant that has not consistently been 
framed as an immediate threat to the town, is not usually at the top of a growing list of 
concerns that residents express about life in Abra Pampa.  However, one of the most 
striking aspects of discourse on contamination and health problems in Abra Pampa, when 
they occur, is the frequency by which class and space are invoked to either recognize or 
deny the gravity of lead contamination.  When residents do talk about the effects of lead, 
there emerges not only a “healthy professional” versus “sick poor” dichotomy, but also 
one which pits the newer (mostly poorer) sections of town against the older, more 
established residential areas of the town center, part of a broader narrative of social 
inequality that some longtime residents of Abra Pampa noted in interviews. 
Several lifelong residents of Abra Pampa attribute the exacerbation of social 
problems to population growth in the town in recent years, and discussion of the effects 
of lead on the population reflect a class bias that is, at times, appalling.  As has been 
mentioned earlier, Abra Pampa‟s population is estimated to have doubled in the ten years 
since 2001, due to a general decline of financial support for small-scale farmers who 
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formerly lived several kilometers away from Abra Pampa and the closure of mines (and 
subsequent exodus from mining towns) in nearby areas, which caused many families to 
migrate to the relatively more urban Abra Pampa in order to access basic necessities, 
education, health care, and potential job opportunities.  As a result, Abra Pampa has been 
growing around the periphery of the town center and to the East of the now-defunct 
railroad tracks that divide the town into East and West (see maps in Chapter One).   
There is a clear, and at times disheartening, division among those who recognize 
the fact that lead contamination is harmful and difficult to “avoid” in Abra Pampa and 
those who insinuate that contamination is exclusively a problem of poverty.  It is true that 
certain conditions of poverty, such as malnutrition and lack of access to potable water, 
likely leave certain sectors of the population of Abra Pampa more vulnerable to the 
effects of exposure to lead waste than others, but the blaming of these sectors for their 
own illnesses related to environmental contamination reflects “toxic uncertainty” to the 
extent that it misrecognizes the sources and potential effects of lead contamination.  This 
chapter illustrates how various perspectives on the extent to which and reasons that 
people suffer often fall along class lines, through the narratives of two residents who 
frame their suffering as compounded by a broader history of structural discrimination, 
and through the perspectives some resident health professionals and the federal and 
provincial-level Mining Secretariat, who offer their own class- and ethnicity-based 
explanations for why lead is – or is not – a widespread problem in Abra Pampa. 
 
ELISA: “WE ARE ALL, IN REALITY, VERY FRAGILE.” 
Elisa, age 28, is the mother of two young children and a lifelong resident of Abra 
Pampa.  She grew up in the town center, a block and a half away from the Metal Huasi 
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smelter, with her parents and eight brothers and sisters in her paternal grandparents‟ 
house, but recently moved to a new, federally-subsidized home with her husband, a 
seasonally-employed construction worker, and children a few blocks away.  Elisa 
remembers being ill for most of her childhood, as were her siblings, a fact that she now 
attributes to living close to Metal Huasi when it was operating.  She suspects that most of 
her and her family‟s health problems can be traced to lead exposure, a fact that she says 
health professionals working in the town are not willing to recognize or treat. 
“They say being here is like being condemned to death,” she says one day over 
coffee in her home as she holds her youngest child, an infant, in her living room.  “We 
suffer here all day.  I lived close to Metal Huasi for most of my life.  I‟ve moved, but it‟s 
also not so far now, right?” she says with a laugh, referring to the fact that she now lives 
about four blocks away. 
“I am worried about my children, especially this one, who was born with green 
and purple marks on her legs and her arm,” she says, motioning to her baby.  She 
suspects these marks, which doctors in Abra Pampa tell her are “normal”, have to do with 
her exposure to lead while she was pregnant.  She says that her son, who is in primary 
school, has problems remembering things he learns in the classroom, and that he cries at 
night because he says his bones hurt.   
“The only thing that helps him is milk,” she says, “but who can afford that every 
day?  If you have money, you can live healthily.”  She notes that dairy products, which 
are important for mitigating the effects of lead exposure because calcium helps prevent 
absorption of lead in bones, are also among the most expensive in local markets.  The 
hospital in Abra Pampa runs a program in which families with young children can receive 
a certain quantity of powdered milk per month, but Elisa notes that children are only 
eligible to receive the milk until they are six years old, so the hospital no longer provides 
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milk for her son.  “Now he lives on ibuprofen,” she says. “He forgets things he learns at 
school.  He is intelligent, and we practice things – letters, math – but sometimes I feel 
like there‟s nothing I can do for him.” 
Elisa mentions that she, her son, and her husband, have had their blood tested for 
lead in order to join the lawsuit headed by the firm of Riad Quintar.  Her husband and son 
have levels of lead in their blood that are clinically considered “high”, exceeding 10 
µg/dL, but that she has 9 µg/dL and therefore, she says, is not at a high risk as they are.  
“I worry about them,” she says, “and me, too, even though I don‟t have as much [lead].  
But I am afraid that I will suddenly get sick.  I forget things, my bones hurt…what if I get 
cancer?  Or leukemia?  The hospital here won‟t help.” 
One of Elisa‟s sisters, who also has an infant child, and mother have also joined 
for coffee this particular afternoon, and explain that Elisa‟s situation is by no means 
unique. 
“They give you ibuprofen for everything,” says her sister, Carolina.  “Here 
everything is a „general infection.‟  You go to the doctor here and say „my bones hurt, I 
forget things,‟ you know, and it‟s always the same.  „Oh, you have a general infection.  
That will pass.‟  What do I do if they tell me I‟m healthy?  They don‟t want to tell me it‟s 
all because of the lead.” 
Elisa, Carolina, and their mother offer numerous examples of the grave health 
problems they believe lead has on life in Abra Pampa.  Their mother, Leticia, mentions a 
son who missed two years of school due to respiratory and growth problems that she now 
thinks were probably caused by living in close proximity to Metal Huasi, and that all of 
her children would regularly have nosebleeds when they were young.  Leticia, who did 
not grow up in Abra Pampa but moved there some 30 years ago when she got married, 
mentions her own respiratory, bone, and memory problems.  “Maybe it‟s because I‟m 
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older, but I‟ve never felt healthy in Abra Pampa, and now I know it‟s from the lead.  It 
affects you psychologically, you know, they talk about suicide, alcoholism…people are 
depressed, children can‟t learn in school.  The doctors don‟t say this, but it‟s all related to 
lead.” 
Elisa, Carolina, and Leticia believe that lead poisoning does not only affect 
humans. Elisa had a dog with four testicles, Carolina had a dog with two rows of teeth in 
his bottom jaw, and Leticia mentions several family friends that have had animals who 
were born blind or without genitals, and goats who have been incapable of producing 
milk.  “You can‟t even sell meat from animals in Abra Pampa,” says Carolina.  “Forget it.  
Nobody will buy it, everyone knows about the lead…But people still eat their own goats, 
llamas, other things that grow here.  It‟s not healthy, but what option are we left with?” 
she asks, referring to the rising prices of meat brought in from other locations. 
“It‟s true, life here is very hard,” says Elisa.  “And the doctors don‟t help with 
anything. Here the doctors are fourth-rate.  We are all, in reality, very fragile.” 
Elisa and her family‟s story is all too familiar among other residents who express 
concerns over the gravity that they believe lead waste poses in Abra Pampa.  They are 
afraid for their and their families‟ livelihoods and they recognize the dangers associated 
with lead exposure, but feel helpless in preventing it from affecting their health, usually 
for economic reasons.  Unable to travel long distances often for higher-quality health 
care, they must accept “general infection” as a diagnosis, ibuprofen as an antidote, and 
physical deformities and pain as “normal.”  As a result, there is a tendency to link all 
problems to lead, a general distrust of all health services, and a subsequent paranoia that 
existing health problems and continued exposure to lead waste will escalate into 
something more serious (cancer, leukemia) without their knowledge.   
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Elisa‟s comment, “If you have money, you can live healthily,” is particularly 
salient here.  Not only do “healthy” foods that would mitigate the effects of or avoid 
contamination (such as meat and plants grown outside of the town) cost more, but quality 
healthcare is much more difficult to access without the time and means to get to the 
places that provide it.  Abra Pampa is the political and economic capital of the region 
known as the puna, but its hospital does not have an operating room or any medical 
specialists.  In fact, the only two cities in the entire province of Jujuy that have hospitals 
with operating rooms are in La Quiaca, about an hour bus ride north of Abra Pampa on 
the border with Bolivia, and in the provincial capital San Salvador, about 3-5 hours south 
of Abra Pampa.  It is not uncommon for people from the area to die en route to one of 
these cities in an emergency, and residents report that waiting time at clinics and 
emergency rooms there can often last several hours, due to the fact that many people need 
to travel from rural areas to these cities to access health care.  It should also be noted that 
many Abra Pampa residents do not own a car and therefore rely on long-distance bus 
service to get to better-quality hospitals in La Quiaca and San Salvador. 
Problematic access basic health services in Abra Pampa reflects structural 
inequalities that fall along ethnic and demographic lines in the area.  Statistics from 2004 
and 2005 note a population of 53,106 Kolla in the provinces of Jujuy and Salta,
62
 roughly 
70% of which does not hold any type of health insurance plan.
63
  24% of the surveyed 
population must travel over 10 km to the nearest public hospital, and 39% of this group 
                                                 
62 INDEC.  Encuesta Complementaria de Pueblos Indígenas (ECPI) 2004-2005, Complementaria del 
Censo Nacional de Población, Hogares y Viviendas 2001.  Cuadro 1.3, “Población kolla por grandes 
grupos de edad.  Jujuy y Salta.  Años 2004-2005.” 
63 Ibid, Cuadro 4.2, “Población kolla por edad según cobertura por obra social y/o plan de salud privado o 
mutual.  Jujuy y Salta.  Años 2004-2005.” 
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includes people, like Abra Pampa residents who need an emergency room, operating 
room, or a visit with a medical specialist, who must travel 50 km or more.
64
  
  
ROCÍO: “HERE IN BARRIO 12 DE OCTUBRE THEY DON’T GIVE US THE TIME OF DAY.” 
Rocío, an elderly woman who runs a small shop in a front room of her house in 
the Barrio 12 de Octubre, moved to Abra Pampa from the countryside to live with her 
son, who had left for Abra Pampa a few years prior, in the early 2000s.  “Oh, lead is a big 
problem here [in 12 de Octubre],” she says.  She holds her back for emphasis as she 
explains how “everything hurts” because of her exposure to lead: her bones, her head, her 
throat. 
“On windy days, when I go outside to hang up the clothes, there‟s such a strong 
smell,” she says, gesturing toward where the football field-sized spread of lead waste has 
remained untouched just a couple of blocks away.  “It comes from that way.  On those 
days, clothes come back a little white.  Lead is everywhere here, but what can we do?” 
“I don‟t go to the hospital anymore,” she says.  “Nothing matters there.  Nothing 
is ever about lead.  Hay que hacerles creer que hay plomo”  (“We have to convince them 
there is lead”), she says, noting the struggle she and other residents face for recognition 
of their health problems. 
Rocío, like many others living in the Barrio 12 de Octubre, frames her exposure to 
lead waste there as part of a larger pattern of discrimination in Abra Pampa.  The Barrio 
12 de Octubre, which expanded around the football field-sized spread of smelter waste a 
few blocks East of Metal Huasi, is on the side of town which has a relative lack of 
infrastructure: roads are unpaved, until recently there were no streetlights, and some 
                                                 
64 Ibid, Cuadro 10.1, “Hogares del pueblo kolla por medio de transporte utilizado por sus integrantes para 
llegar al hospital public más cercano.  Jujuy y Salta.  Años 2004-2005.” 
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houses do not have plumbing.  “Here in Barrio 12 de Octubre they don‟t give us the time 
of day (“No nos dan ni un cinco de importancia”),” she says.  “They talk about 
remediation, but they‟ll never take the lead out.”   
She laughs about the fact that the provincial government installed a chain-link 
fence around waste in the Barrio 12 de Octubre as an initial phase in the remediation 
process, as if that would delineate “contaminated” from “non-contaminated” ground, and 
that it runs so close to some homes in the neighborhood.  “Do you think that‟s really 
where the lead ends?  No!”  she says.  “It‟s everywhere.  This neighborhood is built on 
top of lead.” 
Rocío remembers that, just prior to the time when the chain-link fence was 
installed in the Barrio 12 de Octubre, the municipality put a sign up on top of the waste in 
the neighborhood warning residents to “take care of their health” and that the area was 
contaminated.  “Somebody cut that sign down,” she says.  “People didn‟t pay attention to 
it.  It was right in the middle of their neighborhood.” 
Rocío explains that, what might look like “apathy” toward lead contamination in 
her neighborhood are really just actions taken out of necessity of living there.  “They say 
buy this,” she says, gesturing toward 2-liter bottles of water on the floor of her shop. “But 
that‟s too expensive for people living here.  When people are done using water [for 
bathing, for washing dishes, etc.], they throw it outside on the ground.  They say not to do 
that because the water has lead.  Well, how do we wash ourselves then?”  Rocío says that 
contact with lead is “inevitable” in the Barrio 12 de Octubre.  “Mr. Quintar says this is 
„Chernobyl II,‟” she says. “It‟s all contaminated, and they haven‟t taken any [of the lead] 
away.” 
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“THEY BUY WINE INSTEAD OF MILK.” 
Despite residents‟ growing public concern with lead in recent years, interviewed 
health professionals working in Abra Pampa‟s hospital do not recognize or reflect this 
concern.  One interviewed doctor, when asked if the hospital had provided treatment or 
outreach to Abra Pampa residents concerned about the issue of lead, responded with the 
dichotomous “healthy professional” versus “sick poor” explanation for why certain 
residents, or groups of residents, report having high levels of lead in their blood:  “It‟s a 
question of who knows how to take care of themselves.  They (poor people) buy wine 
instead of milk [which helps mitigate the effects of lead ingestion]”, she says, claiming 
that she and several of her colleagues lived near the pile of waste in the town center for 
years with no apparent health problems. 
Additionally, three interviewed doctors claimed that lead is simply “no longer a 
concern” among Abra Pampa residents who visit the hospital.  “We have so many other 
problems here now,” one of them said, “like alcoholism, depression, cancer…nobody 
talks about lead anymore.”   
In interviews with the University of Texas Human Rights Clinic in Spring of 
2009, officials working in the federal and provincial mining sectors also reflected a class 
bias that blames Abra Pampa residents for their own contamination. Regarding the sign 
and fence that were put up in the Barrio 12 de Octubre, Luis Ferpozzi, who heads 
GEAMIN‟s Abra Pampa remediation project, noted that “illiteracy” was to blame for 
people‟s contact with lead there (implying that they simply could not read the sign that 
had been placed there warning them that the neighborhood was contaminated).  Another 
official in the provincial mining sector said that Barrio 12 de Octubre residents “don‟t 
understand” the risks that lead poses, and “it‟s not the government‟s fault” that someone 
cut the fence to be able to walk across the neighborhood again. 
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Some interviewed residents noted that people who “complain about lead”, namely 
those who are party to Quintar‟s lawsuit, only do so to in order to make money (and it 
should be noted here that none of these quotes are from residents who are party to the 
Quintar suit): 
“There‟s only one thing that‟s true about that lawsuit, and that is that people want 
to become millionaires.” 
“People never talked about lead until money was involved.  Now suddenly 
everyone says they‟re contaminated.” 
“They say Barrio 12 de Octubre is contaminated, but they don‟t do anything about 
it.  They still drink the water.  They still walk on it [field on the lead waste].  And 
for that, Quintar will give them money.” 
The class-based discourse that we see in the stories and quotes outlined above, 
which outlines a “healthy professional” versus “sick poor” dichotomy, shows what 
Auyero and Swistun call “misinformation,” “when residents assume that lead 
contamination is clustered in the poorest section [of town]” and “shifted responsibility,” 
“when respondents argue that poor parenting is responsible for high levels of lead 
contamination.”  Here, illiteracy, alcoholism, and money-grabbing are offered as 
“explanations” for why people, particularly those living in Barrio 12 de Octubre, talk 
about lead.  This ignores and discredits the reality that people like Elisa and Rocío face: 
indifferent doctors, no means to buy the products that might help them stay healthy, and 
the fact that Barrio 12 de Octubre has been largely ignored in remediation plans to date.  
These discourses confuse and obscure the real causes and solutions of lead contamination 
in the town, and also avert responsibility to provide “human remediation” by claiming 
that contamination is preventable.  
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CHAPTER 6: THE “HIDDEN STRUGGLE”: RESISTANCE TO 
DENIAL OF CONTAMINATION 
 
One of the original research questions of the present study of Abra Pampa was to 
explore relationships between “toxic uncertainty” and an apparent lack of collective 
mobilization, a link that is suggested in Javier Auyero and Débora Swistun‟s case study 
of Flammable.  In the introduction to this case study, I mentioned that after spending a 
few weeks in Abra Pampa, it is unclear whether a similar link can be drawn here.  Part of 
the reason for this lies in the challenges that short-term fieldwork presents; without a 
more detailed historiography of the town and the operations of Metal Huasi, and perhaps 
without a sustained presence in Abra Pampa, it is difficult to gauge how the majority of 
residents feel about the topic, what has motivated periods of collective mobilization, and 
to even identify all the moments that residents feel constituted significant periods of 
collective mobilization around the issue of lead.  
However, part of the reason is also personal.  Most of my in-depth conversations 
and sustained relationships in Abra Pampa have been developed with people who say 
they have long been a part of an “invisible” struggle against an issue that has historically 
been equally “invisible”.  Given the origins of my work in Abra Pampa with the Human 
Rights Clinic, which is entirely sympathetic to their cause, I feel that it would do them a 
disservice to present Abra Pampa as a place where there is a total “absence” of 
mobilization or as a case of a “failed” social movement.  Rather than drawing a 
conclusion on whether uncertainty has precluded mobilization or if Abra Pampa is a 
“negative case” (in social movement theory), I would like to present resistance to denial 
of lead contamination as it exists today, even if it is not highly public or coincident with 
 86 
sustained protest, and some of the obstacles residents say they face to framing lead 
contamination as an actionable grievance. 
In their case study of Flammable, Auyero and Swistun reference several other 
academic studies that affirm that “the theoretical and empirical possibility” of positive 
change in environmentally degraded communities exists.
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  According to these studies, 
some of the groundwork for these changes lies in engaging public agencies, pointing out 
apparent contradictions in State discourse, and networking with other like-minded groups 
and actors.  In presenting the “invisible” struggle against opaqueness, misinformation, 
and breaches of rights associated with lead contamination in Abra Pampa, this chapter 
outlines what some of the possibilities for change in the town could be, as voiced by the 
protagonists of this struggle.  Here, two major “frames” have emerged: one is focused on 
criticism of lead as a continual threat to people‟s health and livelihoods – particularly that 
of children, and which is particularly critical of remediation efforts – and another that 
uses environmental contamination in Abra Pampa as a microcosm of problems associated 
with the mining industry in Argentina, couching the problem of lead contamination there 
in broader land rights struggles.  These frames are presented through the stories of Carlos, 
one of the community members who is notoriously vocal about the issue of lead 
contamination, and the members of the Biblioteca Andina, respectively. 
 
CARLOS:  “WE ARE MADE OF LEAD, AND READY FOR THE BATTLE!” 
“I was eight years old when I first came to Abra Pampa.  I saw those black clouds 
[above Metal Huasi, which was then operating] and knew that one day I would fight 
them.”  This is how Carlos, a charismatic Barrio 12 de Octubre resident and outspoken 
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critic of the government‟s inaction on lead contamination, remembers the origins of his 
preoccupation with lead contamination in Abra Pampa.  Originally from a nearby rural 
community, he often traveled to Abra Pampa with his family to buy food and visit 
friends, and remembers “how it would burn when you breathed here, and how it would 
rain lead when Metal Huasi was working.”  He moved to Abra Pampa permanently in the 
mid-1990s and says he loves life in general there, but in recent years, it has been framed 
around a near-constant struggle against the municipal government to remove lead waste, 
to recognize the extent of the problem of contamination, and to provide what he calls 
“human remediation” for people with high levels of lead in their blood. 
“There is no remediation here,” he says, “neither environmental nor human.  So 
we have to keep screwing with them [“seguimos jodiendo”], because they‟ve been 
screwing with us [“que ellos también nos han jodido”].”  In the early 2000s, the 
municipal government granted Carlos a plot of land in the Barrio 12 de Octubre that is 
adjacent to the spread of heavy metal waste that was left there.  Today, when Carlos 
opens the door to his yard, it comes within centimeters of touching the wire fence that 
was installed around the spread of waste there several years after he built his home.  
Between his door and the now fenced-off spread of lead waste, there is a small metal 
cover to what is labeled a “potable water meter” – about half of a meter away from where 
the fence that marks the border between “safe” and “unsafe” lead begins.  Carlos was not 
aware of the harmful effects that the Metal Huasi waste just outside his door would have 
until 2003, when provincial politician and lawyer Riad Quintar took samples of blood 
from him and his children, who were determined to have levels ranging from 15 µg/dL to 
26 µg/dL. 
Since that time, Carlos has become the unofficial spokesperson for those 
concerned about lead contamination, and one of his principal preoccupations has been to 
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“give a face” to the problem.  He often refers to his home as a “base”, the reason for 
which he continues to struggle for recognition of the consequences he and his family 
have suffered for governmental inaction on accumulation of lead waste in Abra Pampa 
and for failure provide adequate health care for dozens of affected families.  Carlos says 
that in the past, the municipal and provincial government has offered him money to move 
halfway across the country to Córdoba to, in his words, “shut me up.”  “But I won‟t do 
it,”  he says.  “I‟m the owner of this house, by this lead, and I‟m not moving so I can keep 
fighting.” 
“This is the base,” he says, gesturing to his yard, a well he is beginning to dig, a 
garage he has just built, a car he is in the middle of repairing.  “Abra Pampa is a bullet 
factory,” he jokes.  “We are made of lead, and ready for the battle!” 
Carlos‟s home does serve as a “base” of sorts for other critics of the denial of 
contamination in Abra Pampa, particularly for other plaintiffs that are party to Riad 
Quintar‟s suit against the municipality.  When Quintar‟s firm hired private teams of 
doctors to come to Abra Pampa to take samples of residents‟ blood, Carlos‟s home 
became a makeshift “laboratory” of sorts where people would come to have their blood 
drawn.  Quintar and his partners come to Abra Pampa periodically to discuss progress on 
the case, and when they do, they meet at Carlos‟s home, where plaintiffs often fill the 
entire yard. 
For a time, Carlos says, many of the plaintiffs in Quintar‟s suit (which now totals 
about 500) formed part of a group known as the Autoconvocados por el Plomo – “Self-
convened on Lead” – which has largely “disbanded” (in the sense that they no longer 
meet regularly) but whose members still attend meetings at Carlos‟s house when Quintar 
and his partners visit from San Salvador de Jujuy, and who constitute a network of people 
whom Carlos dubs “the informed.”  He takes pride in being perhaps the most well-known 
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and among the most consistently vocal critic of the municipal and provincial government 
on the issue of lead, in being one of the first people who visiting reporters contact, and in 
being one of the only of what he terms “regular citizens” who was personally invited to 
CESEL‟s initial meeting with Abra Pampa residents in 2010. 
Carlos fastidiously documents all news on lead contamination and remediation 
progress in Abra Pampa, including not only newspaper articles, pamphlets, and 
announcements on remediation when they are circulated in Abra Pampa, but also any 
other information related to lead or contamination sampling, including private studies 
neighbors have commissioned on their tap water.  In addition to having been offered 
money to move halfway across the country, Carlos notes that he has been threatened by 
provincial officials when they visit Abra Pampa, and that one day an angry neighbor 
broke a bottle and shook it in his face, calling him an “agitator”.   
“I don‟t open my door for just anyone,” he says.  “I don‟t go to the municipality.  
They just throw me out.  They know that I know they‟re not doing anything in Barrio 12 
de Octubre.” 
During the course of my research, Carlos has introduced me to many people – all 
parents of children who have high levels of lead in their blood – who he calls “the 
informed,” the people who recognize that they and their children have lead in their 
bodies, and who will suffer irreversible effects because of it.  These residents have been 
markedly more reserved than he is when they talk about lead, a fact which is likely 
related to the fact that I am a conspicuous outsider, and that Carlos is notorious for 
leading journalists and lawyers around town to “give a face to the lead,” as he often puts 
it.   
“I‟m the only crazy one!”  he says.  “I‟m the only one tells people lead is a 
problem.  These are good people, but they‟re afraid,” he says after one short meeting with 
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a woman who was particularly reluctant to talk about lead (“Lead here is bad, but you 
have to talk to my husband.  He knows more about it,” she says, a common response I 
heard from women.).  “They say journalists have disappeared [when they write about 
lead], they don‟t want to get in trouble with the municipality.  The struggle is half-hidden, 
you know?” 
Indeed, after spending more time and repeatedly visiting several families who 
Carlos has named as part of his “network,” they began to show me things that they have 
hidden.  One family shows me a tattered copy of a magazine from 2007, which has an 
article for which they gave an interview on how lead was affecting their children, which 
they hid under a stack of books on a shelf “so the municipality doesn‟t know we have it.”  
Another resident leaves the interview for a moment to bring me an envelope from another 
room with photos from a march in which he and others took place in 2007 from Abra 
Pampa to San Salvador to draw attention to the lead.  “I had to find it,” he says when he 
presents me the envelope.  “I hid it a long time ago.” 
The fact that public, sustained mobilization seems to have gone away when the 
pile of lead does not mean that concern has as well.  There is a network of “invisible” 
residents who do not lead marches but do stay informed on the effects of lead and 
progress on remediation.  It is difficult to say exactly why public mobilization among 
these residents has not been maintained, and I was not able to spend enough time with all 
of them to glean any kind of nuanced understanding of what exactly changed that has 
kept them “underground” instead of part of a more visible “Autoconvocados” group.  
They represent a group of residents who, as part of the Riad Quintar suit and largely 
residents of the Barrio 12 de Octubre, are using their “contaminated” status to challenge 
the municipality and who give a face to the contamination that is present in their 
neighborhood.  
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BIBLIOTECA ANDINA: “REMEDIATION IS A NEOCOLONIAL PROJECT.” 
 The Biblioteca Ñaupayachaykuna – Quechua for “wisdom of our ancestors” – is 
located in a small room just off Abra Pampa‟s central plaza.  Popularly known as the 
Biblioteca Andina, or “Andean Library,” it is run by a small radical indigenous rights 
group has remained active on the issue of lead contamination by linking the case of Abra 
Pampa to a broader movement opposing the transnational mining presence in Argentina, 
particularly on indigenous territories, calling the promise of remediation for 
contamination that often goes hand-in-hand with extractive industry activity part of an 
international “neocolonial project.” 
The Biblioteca Andina primarily serves as a community resource center on 
critical social thought, and also serves as a sort of gathering point for land rights activists 
in Abra Pampa and the region.  It represents one of the few spaces for resistance in a 
political climate that is impermeable on the human effects of the lucrative export-oriented 
mining industry.  Members of the Biblioteca Andina frame the issue of contamination as 
the outcome of a structural problem, naming capitalist development that relies heavily on 
transnational mining in Argentina as a threat to communities in the region.  The 
Biblioteca Andina‟s framing of contamination and problems with remediation as 
representative of the exploitative practices of the transnational mining industry is a 
radical stance that attempts to point out the systemic root of local oppressions.  
The information provided here on the Biblioteca Andina is compiled from nearly 
daily visits to the library in June and July of 2010, and an extensive 6-hour interview with 
four founding members in late July of 2010.  All members quoted here asked to remain 
anonymous.  The eleven members of the board of the Biblioteca Andina are in what they 
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feel is a minority of Abra Pampa residents who are consistently critical of the issue of 
contamination, and of that minority, they are the only ones who explicitly name 
transnational mining as their “enemy” in voicing discontent with lead contamination.  
They are looking beyond the immediately apparent health and environmental 
consequences of lead contamination to call attention to the structural global forces that 
are at the root of these problems in Abra Pampa and in many other places in Argentina 
where mining plays a prominent role. It is currently run by eleven Abra Pampa residents 
who advocate for a smaller-scale local political and economic structure.   
The Biblioteca Andina has used Metal Huasi and the issue of lead contamination 
stemming from its activities as a “symbol” of transnational mining and remediation 
projects gone wrong, attempting to link people‟s general awareness of the health and 
environmental problems to broader global forces that they argue are threatening 
indigenous communities.  This is a particularly tenuous frame in Abra Pampa, as the only 
direct link between contamination and the transnational mining industry is that lead waste 
that has been removed so far was done so under the auspices of the semi-private 
“Chamber of Mining” of the province of Jujuy, which is comprised of representatives of 
private mining companies that work in the area.  As has been mentioned earlier, the waste 
they hastily and partially removed in late 2008 is now in a nearby lead mine owned by 
Minera Aguilar, which is owned by the Swiss mining group Glencore AG.  Many 
residents of Abra Pampa who were interviewed during the course of ethnographic 
research share a general suspicion that the Chamber of Mining only removed waste from 
which its representatives knew they would be able to profit.  The challenge for members 
of the Biblioteca Andina is to abstract this sentiment to a general criticism of the 
transnational mining industry, which is one of their strongest causes.   
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One of ways in which the members of the Biblioteca Andina use local struggles to 
resist transnational mining is linked to the library‟s mission to recover and promote the 
indigenous Kolla identity.  Its members regularly hold workshops and conversation hours 
to promote the study of Quechua, a language that is indigenous to the area but that is 
barely spoken in the region anymore.  Members of the library have tried, in public 
workshops and in pamphlets they have generated, to demonstrate how both the logic and 
contaminating effects of the transnational mining industry threaten local cultural identity 
and survival.  Founding members have emphasized in interviews that in Quechua, there is 
no equivalent word or concept for “personal freedom,” as it is believed that each person 
is born with the obligation to care for each other and for the Pachamama, “Mother 
Earth.”  “The logic of capitalism and personal profit isn‟t part of our culture,” one of the 
founding members noted.  “When we say „no mining in Jujuy‟, we also say „no‟ to that 
logic.”  Additionally, the Biblioteca Andina emphasizes that contamination and taking 
resources from the earth goes against cultural traditions that emphasize care of the 
Pachamama.  “Making a hole in the Pachamama to take things out would be the same as 
making a hole in your mother,” a founding member noted.  “And look what happens 
when you do that,” he said, gesturing toward an area of his neighborhood where waste 
from lead taken from nearby mines remains untouched. 
The Biblioteca Andina is particularly critical of efforts to promote “sustainable 
mining” in the region, as members say that accepting mining activity, even on 
“sustainable” terms, is still not in the local community‟s interest.  “Remediation is a 
neocolonial project,” one of the founding members told me.  “„We‟ll take your water, 
damage your land, make money, but then fix the problems we created.‟ That sounds like 
colonialism, doesn‟t it?”  When members of the Biblioteca Andina talk about 
remediation, they almost always criticize the Inter-American Development Bank and the 
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provincial government of Jujuy for rhetorically “engaging” with the community through 
news reports on meetings with the community (to which the members claim they are 
never invited), but in reality failing to provide any proactive, transparent information on 
progress of remediation.  Private transnational companies such as the aforementioned 
Peruvian enterprise CESEL are contracted to determine the levels of risk in the town, yet 
results of these studies are rarely divulged to the community.  “Where is that money 
going?” one of the members of the Biblioteca Andina asked in an interview.  “They 
[municipality of Abra Pampa] pay these experts not to tell us anything, while we suffer.  
Jujuy.  Mining capital of Argentina.” 
Indeed, public criticism on contamination stemming from extractive industry 
activity has been an especially difficult issue to discuss in the province, which is why 
some Abra Pampa residents talk about the State‟s stance in an almost conspiratorial tone.  
Members of the Biblioteca Andina acknowledge that framing the issue of contamination 
as a microcosm of general structural problems associated with transnational mining is 
difficult in Abra Pampa precisely because Minera Aguilar, the company now owned by 
the Swedish company Glencore that has ostensibly stored the lead waste that has been 
taken from Abra Pampa so far, maintains a strong presence in the town.  Minera Aguilar 
trucks, jackets, and hats are commonly seen in the town, and ads for employment in the 
nearby lead mine are plastered to places such as the doors of the town‟s hospital and bus 
station.  “We want to say “No” to mining in Jujuy.  Period,” one of the founding 
members explained.  “But it‟s difficult because they (mining companies) play with our 
basic needs.”  The founding members of the Biblioteca Andina claim that many of the 
newer models of cars, and possibly even newer houses in the town, have been bought 
with “silver/plata from the mine” (in Argentinean Spanish, “silver” and “cash” share the 
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same word, plata, and are often used interchangeably in tongue-in-cheek dialogue on the 
subject of the lucrative mining industry.) 
In trying to call more public attention to lead contamination in Abra Pampa to 
advocate radical systemic economic change, members of the Biblioteca Andina are 
attempting to maintain local “ownership” of the struggle, while connecting with 
communities throughout the area that are similarly affected by mining activity.  
Biblioteca Andina members, who are in a very slim minority in Abra Pampa, note that 
reliance on employment on mines, plus a general fear of speaking out against a largely 
impermeable State, make it difficult to mobilize Abra Pampa residents around their 
cause.  “They took away the small mountain of lead in the town center, and now people 
say, „Well, that‟s a thing of the past,‟” one member noted.  When more immediate 
“solutions” for local concerns become generally accepted, it is difficult to garner support 
for a broader-looking, more global solution to the problem.   
The testimonies present here – in Carlos‟s affirmation that he and a whole 
network of residents are “ready for war” and the Biblioteca Andina‟s resources and 
discourse on opposition to mining – represent the fact that empirical “potential” for 
change and mobilization exists in Abra Pampa.  Despite the fact that many residents say 
that collective mobilization died down after the pile of lead was taken away from the 
Metal Huasi site in late 2008, there remains a core group of concerned citizens who note 
that contamination in their bodies, homes, and surrounding environment is a political 
issue, and use said contamination as a means of challenging State policies (insufficient 
remediation, links to transnational mining companies).  The relative lack of collective 
mobilization in Abra Pampa that coincided with initiation of remediation in 2008 may be 
read as “hope,” as in Flammable, “in what the government, the companies, or lawyers 
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and judges will do on their behalf, not on what they can jointly achieve,”66 but the fact 
that many are dissatisfied and distrustful of government actions toward remediation so far 
may motivate future public discussion. 
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CONCLUSION 
The question of lead contamination in Abra Pampa is fraught with ambiguity.  It 
has provoked waves of protest from Abra Pampa residents, attracted sporadic 
investigations from outsiders, garnered simultaneous acknowledgment and denial of 
health concerns from various State agencies, and become (at least on paper) the object of 
a recent Inter-American Development Bank directive to promote “environmentally 
sustainable” activities in the mining sector.  Today, however, there is no common 
narrative on contamination among Abra Pampa residents.  Though most are aware of the 
potential health risks that Metal Huasi waste poses, many interviewed residents noted a 
general subsidence of public concern on the issue once the most visible, emblematic 
portion of it was taken away in early 2009: the 15,000-ton pile at the Metal Huasi site.  
Residents now await the full completion of environmental remediation, and in the 
meantime, their exposure to dangerous toxins has not been minimized.  Hundreds of 
residents living in the Barrio 12 de Octubre continue interact with lead waste daily, due to 
its close proximity to homes and general easiness of accessibility.  In addition, barely-
visible humos blancos continue to spread throughout the town.  Absent the strikingly 
visual reminder of its contamination and as the result of the intersection of multiple 
discourses on its extent and gravity, the issue of lead waste in Abra Pampa has largely 
become obscured in the public eye. 
This study does not intend to suggest that there is no concern on the potential 
risks associated with lead waste in the town.  Rather, it is an attempt to show that the 
“toxic uncertainty” that has arisen is a product of apathy and structural discrimination 
from agencies leading projects of development related to the mining industry.  Multiple 
discourses on contamination often fall along class and lines, and tend to defer to the 
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institutions that are responsible for a problematic, misguided remediation effort that does 
not address the human impact of environmental risks.  These multiple discourses reflect a 
lack of consensus on the extent and gravity of lead contamination, which has affected the 
degree to which it is defined as an objective health threat to all residents.  Furthermore, 
the fact that lead has been a “normal” part of the landscape in Abra Pampa for decades 
has presented challenges for those who seek to define it as an intolerable injustice.  This 
normalization of contamination, and a lack of clear, consistent information on the health 
and environmental effects lead waste poses (particularly in the time since the 
environmental remediation plan was drafted), has made it difficult for residents to 
identify and define the extent to which lead is responsible for health problems, and 
political authorities to offer blanket denials of criticism for failing to provide 
environmental and “human” remediation that adequately addresses health concerns.  
Those who do maintain that lead is a problem find themselves in the position of needing 
to, as one resident put it, “convince” governmental and health authorities that they are, in 
fact, affected. 
Various State actors have attempted to downplay and deny risks that residents 
face in Abra Pampa, perhaps in the name of protecting the lucrative mining industry.  
Public discrediting of studies that have revealed unfavorable aspects of the human 
consequences of the industry are labeled “scientifically invalid”, and intransparent 
management of waste appears to be an attempt to avert “issueness” that labels lead waste 
in Abra Pampa as an effect of mining industry activity in Jujuy.  Further, the rhetorical 
monopoly on “legitimate” information entrenches power imbalances between the local 
government and those who suffer from lead contamination in Abra Pampa, and 
nonexistent or contradictory scientific study results may be read as attempts to keep the 
issue of lead at the margin, or not on any political agenda at all. 
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Information from “outsiders” on the question of lead has both reified and denied 
problems people believe are associated with lead, and interventions toward remediation – 
while promising on paper – have both compounded confusion on which parts and 
locations of lead waste are “most harmful” and entrenched distrust in government 
officials charged with carrying it out.  While many credit health studies with helping 
provide a frame around which for people to mobilize to have lead taken out of Abra 
Pampa, but they also exacerbate confusion when people get contradictory results – or 
never receive their results at all.  The pace of remediation and the intransparency with 
which it has been managed have given host to a slew of rumors that signal distrust in the 
provincial government for its ties with the mining industry, and also send mixed signals 
about which lead waste is dangerous, given the fact that much of it remains in the town. 
Problems associated with lead contamination are also marginalized within Abra 
Pampa itself, namely through residents‟ denial of the idea that lead can be an objective 
threat to everyone.  Discourse on contamination tends to fall on class lines.  A “sick 
poor” versus “healthy professional” dichotomy has developed, one in which poor 
people‟s behaviors or “illiteracy” is blamed for their own contamination, while people 
who do acknowledge suffering from lead contamination attribute the fact to poor, 
discriminatory social services in the town.  The “sick poor” versus “healthy professional” 
dichotomy fits within a broader narrative of “social decline” in the town. 
Finally, those who have remained consistently critical of the government and of 
the prolonged existence of lead waste in Abra Pampa feel they are part of an “invisible 
struggle” to give a voice and call attention to the problems they and their neighbors face 
due to lead poisoning.  They offer their contaminated bodies and homes as irrefutable 
evidence of the damages lead can cause, and link the presence of lead waste to a broader, 
more radical political struggle to stop mining activity in the town and province.  These 
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residents frame lead contamination as a means to subvert the State‟s “disinformation” 
campaigns, as well as to advocate smaller-scale, autonomous politics.  These residents – 
though admittedly in the minority of the population in Abra Pampa – represent some 
“empirical possibilities” for positive change in Abra Pampa. 
The implications of these snapshots for major strands of thought on the exercise 
of power, particularly the perspectives of Lukes, Crenson, and Gaventa in Chapter Two, 
are as follows.  These authors‟ definitions of “power” hinge on latent conflict; coercion 
alone does not define power, but keeping things from the public political arena might 
reflect a similar lack of political debate, upheaval, and “issueness” at the grassroots level.  
In a way, the case of Abra Pampa does appear to fit into this model of the “third 
dimension” of power, since public agencies and officials both recognize and deny a 
presumed objective health threat, and manage the issue intransparently.  This violates 
citizen‟s rights to information, health, and a healthy environment, yet the promise of an 
“ever-imminent” environmental remediation is, perhaps, meant to keep these grievances 
at bay. 
One key component of Gaventa‟s particular conceptualization of power, that of 
the “shaping of beliefs about the order‟s legitimacy or immutability,” which maintains 
inequality.  The very fact that there is a core – if minority – group of citizens who are 
dissatisfied with remediation plans (who are consistently critical of its pace, 
intransparency, and manipulation of information) seems to show that Abra Pampa 
residents do not believe the political order is “legitimate” or “immutable”.  They continue 
to use claims of measured levels of lead in their bodies and environment to challenge the 
State and its policies, sometimes radically, by using contamination as an example of the 
ills that unchecked industrial activity can have on “invisible” communities such as Abra 
Pampa. 
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What this case study adds to the literature on uncertainty, I hope, is a sketch of the 
“empirical and theoretical possibilities” for positive change in the town.  Abra Pampa has 
many things in common with case studies of other highly-contaminated communities 
which face similar levels of “toxic uncertainty” – namely that conflicting narratives 
reflect greater social and power imbalances in the region, and that competing discourses 
construct uncertainty on the sources and effects of contamination.  Though here it is 
perhaps easier for residents to name the “culprit” of the environmental suffering they 
endure, since lead and Metal Huasi are generally considered to blame, rather than 
multiple contaminants stemming from multiple factories, there is still disagreement over 
how and whether lead continues to pose a serious health risk to all residents (particularly 
since efforts toward “remediation” began a few years ago).  Still, the fact that several past 
“waves” of protest have already occurred in the town, and that a core group of concerned 
residents continues to try to “convince” others that there is indeed still harmful lead 
contamination in the town and in residents‟ bodies, suggests that maybe residents are not 
as acquiescent or compliant as it may seem on the surface. 
Another major difference between Auyero and Swistun‟s case study of 
Flammable and that of Abra Pampa is that, while in Flammable presumably people are 
hoping to leave to move to a different neighborhood as a “solution” to the problem of 
contamination, in Abra Pampa there have been far fewer instances in which people 
expressed a desire to leave, possibly due to its different rural and cultural context.  As a 
town whose residents overwhelmingly identify as Kolla, there is a strong defense of 
territory that many activists in the area draw upon to further defend their right to live in a 
healthy environment, and which has aided in building consciousness of an objective 
threat that lead waste poses.  Additionally, many residents cited the tranquility of Abra 
Pampa as a positive aspect of life there, one which they would not trade to live in another 
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town or city.  These strong territorial ties may contribute to invocation of rights principles 
when advocating for cleanup of the lead waste, and residents often refer to the 
Pachamama and familial ties they have to the area as reasons not to leave, perhaps in 
spite of health problems that lead may pose. 
In this sense, Abra Pampa mirrors several other cases in the province of Jujuy, 
which is mostly rural and has a relatively high number of indigenous communities who 
have recently begun to push for greater territorial autonomy and where a “No a la mina” 
(literally “No to the mine”) movement has gained momentum in recent years.  As is seen 
in the discussion of the Biblioteca Andina, Metal Huasi has been taken as one of many 
symbolic cases of the environmental damage that can be wrought with mining activity, 
making Abra Pampa one of many locations in the province of Jujuy which has become 
synonymous, at least to environmental activists, with the type of environmental risks that 
are posed there.  These towns‟ “tag lines,” which often come up in discussions with 
environmental and indigenous rights activists in the area, highlight the fact that their very 
identities are beginning to be formed around the toxins they are believed to contain: 
“Abra Pampa: Lead in the blood,” “Susques: Arsenic in the water,”  “Palpalá: The most 
contaminated city in Argentina,” “Pan de Azúcar: Cyanide in the soil.”   These local 
environmental conflicts are abstracted to join larger political struggles in the area, and the 
fact that provincial mining authorities so strongly try to discredit or prevent independent 
studies from groups like INQA (and researchers like myself and colleagues with the 
Human Rights Clinic) may eventually bolster activists‟ causes. 
The rising consciousness of the actual dangers present in these areas, namely as 
the result of mining and other extractive industry activity, coupled with a rising 
consciousness and use of rights language and networking between similarly-affected 
communities in the area, may present a promising future for positive change in Abra 
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Pampa.  Despite the fact that most interviewed residents feel that public protest on lead 
contamination “peaked” immediately before the 15,000-ton pile of lead was taken away 
from the Metal Huasi site, there remains a strong current of concern on the effects that 
exposure to remaining lead waste has on residents‟ health and livelihood.  Whether this 
concern will translate to another sustained wave of public protest remains to be seen, but 
these critical voices, who often say they feel as though they are fighting in an “invisible” 
struggle, give a name and face to a sustained health crisis in the town. 
Studies of communities that face “toxic uncertainty” may help to shed light on 
how and why conceptualization of environmental justice emerges.  Literature and 
conceptualization of environmental justice often centers on movements to stop a certain 
activity from happening.  In cases such as Abra Pampa and Flammable, where 
contamination has a “slow incubation period” and remains long after the industrial 
activity has ceased, there is an additional layer to uncertainty.  In Abra Pampa, for 
example, lead has not historically been a political issue, and confusion on the extent to 
which it presents actual risk stems partially from the process of trying to make it so.  
Though the source of contamination here is known – lead waste from Metal Huasi – it is 
not entirely clear exactly how and why this waste is harmful, nor is there a concrete 
activity around which neighbors can mobilize to end the problems they believe they face 
from the contamination (i.e., no factory to close).   
For them, the challenge in raising consciousness of – or even conceptualizing –  
the continued injustice that they and their neighbors face, despite partial removal of lead 
waste, has to do with reframing the lead waste that remains as a continual threat.  Part of 
the reason this is so difficult is that the lead waste that remains in the town is still very 
much a part of residents‟ daily interactions with their environment – lead waste in the 
Barrio 12 de Octubre doubles as a soccer field, humos blancos continue to be distributed 
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around town, and neither of these components are highly-visible or have been part of 
sustained studies on health and environmental contamination in the town. 
Recently, however, renewed interest in collective mobilization on the 
environment seems to be on the horizon.  In November of 2010, the city council of Abra 
Pampa approved an ordinance to prohibit mining in Abra Pampa, a move that put 
environmental and indigenous rights at the forefront of political discussion and which is 
related to the widespread presence of contamination there. While Abra Pampa mayor 
Ariel Machaca vetoed this ordinance in December of 2010, the veto was overturned about 
a month later as the result of citizen protest.
67
  It is difficult to say whether this 
mobilization has been or will be sustained, given the politically hostile climate that exists 
in Abra Pampa between activists and Machaca, but the fact that it has occurred highlights 
that Abra Pampa, now notorious for lead waste that it contains, may see changes on the 
horizon. 
  
                                                 
67 See Aranda, Darío.  “Otro pueblo libre de minería contaminante.”  Pagina/12, 16 January 2011.  
Available at http://www.pagina12.com.ar/diario/sociedad/3-160565-2011-01-16.html 
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